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Title 18 Section 924(c) of the U.S. Code subjects a person who uses or carries a firearm during a “crime of violence” to a mandatory minimum sentence of five years. Section 924(c)(3)(A) defines a “crime of violence” as a felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.”
To determine whether an offense falls within Section 924(c)(3)(A)’s “elements clause,” the court applies the categorical approach, asking whether the offense in question always involves the use, attempted use or threatened use of force.
In this case, Salvatore Delligatti was convicted of violating Section 924(c) after he recruited gang members to kill a suspected police informant and gave them a loaded revolver to carry out the job.
Before trial, Delligatti moved to dismiss his Section 924(c) charge, arguing that the charge lacked the required predicate crime of violence, but the district court denied his motion. Delligatti’s indictment charged him with attempted murder under the violent-crimes-in-aid-of-racketeering, or VICAR, statute under Section 1959(a)(5), which required proof that Delligatti had attempted second-degree murder under New York law.
Delligatti argued that a VICAR offense predicated on New York second-degree murder is not a crime of violence under Section 924(c)’s elements clause because homicide under New York law can be committed by omission, defined as the failure to perform a legal duty. The 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s conclusion that New York attempted second-degree murder is a crime of violence for purposes of Section 924(c)(3)(A).
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against another person within the meaning of Section 924(c)(3)(A).
The high court reasoned that it is impossible to deliberately cause physical harm without the use of physical force under Section 924(c).
It affirmed the lower court ruling.
Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. and Justices Samuel Alito Jr., Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined.
In the dissenting opinion, Gorsuch disagreed with the majority’s finding that an act of omission necessarily involves the use of physical force. “Section 924(c)(3)(A) may reach many crimes, but it does not reach crimes of omission,” he wrote.
Patrick Thompson took out three loans totaling $219,000 from one bank. After the bank failed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation became responsible for collecting the outstanding loans. During a call with the FDIC’s loan servicer, Thompson disputed the $269,120.58 balance shown on his invoice (which consisted of the $219,000 Thompson had borrowed plus interest), stating that he had “no idea where the 269 number comes from” and that he borrowed $110,000. Thompson made similar statements in a later call with FDIC contractors.
Thompson was later charged with violating Title 18 Section 1014 of the U.S. Code, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement” to influence the FDIC’s action on any loan. A jury found Thompson guilty, and he moved for acquittal, arguing that his statements were not false because he had in fact borrowed $110,000, even though he later borrowed more.
The lower courts concluded that they did not need to reach that argument because they read Section 1014 to also criminalize misleading statements, and Thompson’s statements were at least misleading.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that Section 1014, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement,” does not criminalize statements that are misleading but not false.
The court explained that statutory text criminalizes “false statement[s]” but does not use the word “misleading.” False and misleading are two different things, according to the court opinion.
The court reasoned that a misleading statement can be true, and a true statement is not false. Given that, the court determined it is significant that the statute uses only the word “false,” which means “not true.” Adding “any” before “false statement” does not transform the scope of the statute.
The high court vacated the decision of the lower court and remanded the case.
Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. Justices Samuel Alito Jr. and Ketanji Brown Jackson filed concurring opinions.