In Re Bailey v. Hermacinski
In this original proceeding, the Colorado Supreme Court considered the scope of the physician–patient privilege in a medical-malpractice action.
Section 13-90-107(1)(d) of the Colorado Revised Statutes prohibits certain medical providers from revealing information about a patient gathered in the course of treating that patient. That prohibition, however, is not unlimited.
That section of the CRS states that when a patient sues their medical provider, information “arising out of or connected with” that provider’s treatment of the patient is not protected by the physician–patient privilege. And section 13-90-107(1)(d)(II) deems information held by a non-party medical provider who was “in consultation with” a defendant as similarly outside the protection of the physician–patient privilege.
Yampa Valley Medical Center sought ex parte interviews with a number of non-party medical providers. Thus, the dispute did not implicate the physician–patient relationship between Kelley Bailey and Yampa Valley Medical Center meaning section 107(1)(d)(I) was inapplicable. Instead, the issue was whether the non-party medical providers were “in consultation with” Yampa Valley Medical Center such that section 107(1)(d)(II) removed typically privileged information from the protection of the physician–patient privilege.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that the non-party medical providers were not in consultation with Yampa Valley Medical Center for the purposes of section 107(1)(d)(II). However, the case was remanded to the trial court for consideration of whether Kelley and Michael Bailey impliedly waived the physician–patient privilege for the non-party medical providers.
Hernandez v. Ray Domenico Farms The Colorado Supreme Court looked at how far back in time a terminated employee’s unpaid wage claims can reach under the Colorado Wage Claim Act, section 8-4-101 to -123 of the Colorado Revised Statutes.
The Supreme Court held that, under the plain language of section 8-4-109, a terminated employee may seek any wages or compensation that were unpaid at the time of termination; however, the right to seek such wages or compensation is subject to the statute of limitations found in section 8-4-122.
That statute of limitations begins to run when the wages or compensation first become due and payable and thus limits a terminated employee to claims for the two years (three for willful violations) immediately preceding termination.
People v. Robles-Sierra
Fernando Robles-Sierra challenged his four convictions for sexual exploitation of a child on several grounds. One is that the district court “closed” the courtroom, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, by allowing the prosecutor to show portions of exhibits containing video recordings and still images of children to the jurors on a screen that couldn’t be seen by people in the courtroom gallery. This was the first time the issue had been presented to a Colorado appellate court. The Court of Appeals held that no closure occurred.
Also as a matter of first impression, the court considered the meanings of “publishes” and “distributes” in the child sexual exploitation statute.
The Court of Appeals concluded that when the defendant downloaded sexually exploitative material to his computer using peer-to-peer file sharing software and saved the material in sharable files or folders accessible by others also using such software, he both published and distributed the material.
Taylor v. Long
Ladee Taylor’s medical malpractice lawsuit was dismissed after she failed to serve the defendants, Cindy Long, Stacey Hennesy, The Women’s Health Group and HCA-HealthONE, North Suburban Medical Center, with a copy of her complaint within the time allotted by the district court’s delay reduction order.
On appeal, Taylor contended that the district court failed to provide the requisite notice before dismissing the action and applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating whether she had demonstrated excusable neglect. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the first contention but agreed with the second. Therefore, the Court of Appeals vacated the court’s order dismissing Taylor’s lawsuit and remanded for further findings.
Abu-Nantambu-El v. State of Colorado
Abdu-Latif Kazembe Abu-Nantambu-El, appealed the district court’s order granting the State of Colorado’s motion to dismiss his petition for compensation pursuant to the “Compensation for Certain Exonerated Persons” statute, sections 13-65-101 to -103 of the Colorado Revised Statutes. As a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant-petitioner whose felony convictions were vacated, but who remained convicted of a misdemeanor in the same case, was eligible for compensation under the Exoneration Statute.
The Court of Appeals concluded he was not. The court further concluded that, because he was not eligible to file a petition under the Exoneration Statute, the Court of Appeals need not address whether the court deprived him of his right to a jury trial under the statute. Accordingly, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order granting the state’s motion to dismiss.
Marriage of Humphrey
A division of the Court of Appeals decided, as a matter of first impression, whether a district court’s power to appoint a receiver trumps Colorado’s marijuana licensing laws. Here, the appointed receiver was not licensed to operate marijuana businesses as required by the Colorado Retail Marijuana Code and the Colorado Medical Marijuana Code.
The Court of Appeals held that courts may only appoint receivers for marijuana businesses who are licensed under Colorado marijuana licensing laws.
Accordingly, the division reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with directions.
Meardon v. Freedom Life Insurance
Freedom Life Insurance Company of America denied health insurance benefits claimed by Kathryn Meardon under a health insurance policy issued to her by Freedom Life.
The Court of Appeals decided whether that policy’s mandatory arbitration clause was displaced by section 10-3-1116(3) of the Colorado Revised Statutes which allows denied claims to be contested in court before a jury. The Court of Appeals concluded that it is.
The policy purchased by Meardon set forth a three-step procedure for contesting a denied claim. At issue was the last step: final and binding arbitration.
The policy expressly prohibits the filing of any state or federal court action.
Section 10-3-1116(3), by contrast, provides that an insured who is wholly or partially denied a claim for health benefits “shall be entitled” to de novo review in any court with jurisdiction and to a trial by a jury, after exhausting administrative remedies.
The question before the court was whether Meardon was bound by the policy’s arbitration clause or whether she may seek relief from a jury in a court.
To resolve the case, the Court of Appeals first analyzed the “conformity clause” that Freedom Life elected to include in its policy. Then the court addressed the issues presented both by the Federal Arbitration Act 9 United States Code section 1-16 and the arcane doctrine of reverse- preemption under the McCarren-Ferguson Act, 15 United States Code section 1011- 1015, which may or may not preempt section 10-3-1116(3) and render the arbitration clause operative.
Freedom Life appealed the trial court’s order that denied their motion to dismiss or compel arbitration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order as to those claims. However, because some of Meardon’s claims fell outside the scope of the statute, the Court of Appeals reversed the court’s order to that extent and remanded with directions.
Crocker v. Greater Colorado
A division of the Court of Appeals considered whether the liquidated damages term of a non-compete provision in a shareholder-employment agreement is enforceable against a doctor who exercised his right to dissent from a corporate merger pursuant to section 7-113-102 of the Colorado Revised Statutes.
The majority agreed with the district court in concluding that the term was not enforceable against the doctor because it was unreasonable to enforce the provision against a dissenting shareholder forced out of employment by the action of a merger and the liquidated damages were not reasonably related to the injury actually suffered as required by C.R.S. section 8-2-113(3). The special concurrence agreed only with the latter conclusion.
The division further rejected the doctor’s contention that the district court erroneously excluded the price paid to non-dissenting shareholders from its judicial appraisal of his share’s “fair value,” as defined in C.R.S. section 7-113-101(4) and by the Colorado Supreme Court in Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court.
In re Marriage of Boettcher
In this appeal of a post-dissolution of marriage order modifying the amount of the father’s child support obligation, a division of the Court of Appeals addressed the requirements for modifying such support when the parents’ combined incomes exceed $30,000 per month, the highest level of the support schedule in section 14-10-115(7)(b) of the Colorado Revised Statutes.
The division rejected the father’s argument that the support obligation at the highest level is the presumptive amount under the guidelines, such that any greater award constitutes a deviation requiring findings in accordance with section 14-10-115(8)(e).
Rather, consistent with the plain language of section 14-10-115(7)(a)(II)(E), the district court may use discretion to determine support in such high income cases, but the presumptive amount shall not be less than it would be based on the highest level of the schedule.
In this case, the district court applied the correct legal standard in finding that there was no presumptive child support amount under the parties’ circumstances, acknowledging the minimum presumptive amount under the guidelines, and then using its discretion to determine a higher amount based on the factors in section 14-10-115(2)(b).
The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the district court.
White v. Estate of Soto- Lerma
A division of the Court of Appeals considered whether Colorado’s nonclaim statute, section 15-12-803(3)(b) of the Colorado Revised Statutes prevents a plaintiff from recovering prejudgment interest and costs above the limit of a liability insurance policy when the action was filed after expiration of the statutory period for presentation of claims.
The division also evaluated whether the policy limit capped the plaintiff’s recovery even where a jury awarded damages in excess of a statutory offer of settlement.
Because prejudgment interest is a form of compensatory damages, the Court of Appeals concluded that an award of such damages beyond the insurance policy limit is barred.
And because section 15-12-803 bars “all [untimely] claims” against an estate, with the exception of claims “[t]o the limits of the insurance protection only,” section 15-12-803(3)(b), the division concluded that any untimely filed claim and resulting judgment in excess of policy limits is also barred.
The Court of Appeals finally concluded that the nonclaim statute precluded an award of costs to be entered based on a jury award in excess of a statutory settlement offer for policy limits under C.R.S. section 13-17-202(1)(a)(I).
People v. Ray and Concerning Lindecrantz
Greta Lindecrantz appealed the trial court’s order holding her in direct contempt for refusing to testify pursuant to the People’s subpoena in this Criminal Procedure 32.2 proceeding. She contended that requiring her to testify in response to questions posed by the prosecutor on direct examination violated her rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that any potential burden on those rights must give way to the state’s paramount interests in ascertaining the truth and rendering justice. The Court of Appeals affirmed.