Norton v. Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc.
The Supreme Court considered whether the petitioner’s complaint alleged a violation of article five, section 50 of the Colorado Constitution sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss.
The Supreme Court held that to state a claim for relief under section 50, a complaint must allege that the state made a payment to a person or entity — whether directly to that person or entity, or indirectly through an intermediary — for the purpose of compensating them for performing an abortion and that such an abortion was actually performed.
Because the petitioner’s complaint did not allege that the state made such a payment, the complaint failed to state a claim for relief under Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5). Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
People v. Bueno
A jury found David Bueno, a state-prison inmate, guilty of first-degree murder and conspiracy in a case concerning a white inmate’s death. The case took more than two months to try, involved hundreds of motions and generated tens of thousands of pages of discovery. Fifteen months after Bueno’s conviction — but before he was sentenced — the prosecution disclosed, as relevant in the case, two reports that had been in its possession since the first days of the investigation. One report documented the discovery of a note found on the day of the murder indicating that white supremacists were planning to murder white inmates in the prison.
The other evinced a detective’s suspicion that the murder was linked to another homicide that had been committed in the prison a few days later.
Arguing that this belated disclosure violated Brady v. Maryland, Bueno moved for a new trial under Criminal Procedure 33(c). The trial court, which had presided over the entirety of the case, found a discovery violation and determined that a new trial was warranted. A division of the Court of Appeals affirmed in a split opinion.
The appeal required the Colorado Supreme Court to address two questions.
The first was whether Bueno’s Rule 33(c) motion was time-barred because he filed it more than a year after his conviction, and thus arguably more than a year after “entry of judgment.” The second is whether the trial court erred in concluding that the prosecution violated Brady’s disclosure requirement and, specifically, whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the evidence at issue was material and that the prosecution violated Criminal Procedure 16.
As to the first issue, the Colorado Supreme Court held that “entry of judgment” for purposes of Rule 33 occurs after delivery of a verdict of guilt and imposition of a sentence.
Hence, because Bueno filed his Rule 33 motion before the trial court sentenced him, the court concluded that he filed the motion before entry of judgment, meaning it was not time-barred.
As to the second issue, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the trial court applied appropriate legal standards in ruling on Bueno’s Brady claim and no clear error in the trial court’s factual findings was perceived. Accordingly, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial, and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
People v. Griego
Prosecutors charged Isidore Griego with attempted reckless manslaughter and attempted second-degree assault arising out of two incidents in which Griego drove drunk but due to traffic conditions at the time of the incidents did not ultimately put any particular persons at risk.
The Colorado Supreme Court had to decide whether the requirement in the attempted reckless manslaughter and attempted second-degree assault statutes that a defendant place “another person” at risk of death or serious bodily injury necessitates that an actual, discernible person be placed at risk, or if “another person” can refer to the public at large.
The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the statutes at issue required a showing of a risk to an actual, discernible person and that a risk to the public at large is insufficient.
Holding otherwise would leave the statutes without a clear limiting principle and would raise equal protection concerns. Accordingly, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the evidence did not support Griego’s convictions for attempted reckless manslaughter and attempted second degree assault. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the division’s judgment.
People v. Figueroa- Lemus
Eswin Figueroa-Lemus appealed the district court’s order denying his Criminal Procedure 32(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
The Colorado Court of Appeals first considered whether it has jurisdiction to consider the appeal given that the guilty plea involves a deferred judgment that is still in effect.
The Court of Appeals concluded that it does because the Supreme Court in Kazadi v. People expressly provided that a defendant may challenge such a plea under Criminal Procedure 32(d). In doing so, the Court of Appeals declined to follow People v. Sosa.
Next, the Court of Appeals considered the merits and rejected Figueroa-Lemus’s argument that counsel were constitutionally ineffective for failing to advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order.
People v. Campbell
Brandon Campbell appealed his judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of two counts of second-degree burglary, one count of attempted second-degree burglary and three counts of criminal mischief.
He contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress global positioning system location data obtained via an ankle monitor he wore at the time of his arrest.
A division of the Court of Appeals considered whether Campbell has a reasonable expectation of privacy under the U.S. and Colorado constitutions in GPS data acquired from a defendant’s ankle monitor.
The division concluded that Campbell did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when the GPS data was voluntarily given to law enforcement officials by the company that owned the ankle monitor.
The division further concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting the GPS evidence without first conducting a hearing to assess its reliability pursuant to People v. Shreck.
The division also rejected Campbell’s contentions that he was seized and searched in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the victim’s in-court identification should have been suppressed due to an unconstitutionally suggestive out-of-court identification procedure.
Accordingly, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction.
People v. Palacios Jose Palacios was convicted of felony murder, aggravated robbery and other offenses after a drug-deal-turned-robbery ended in the shooting death of the victim by Palacios’ accomplice.
On appeal, Palacios challenged his convictions on two grounds.
First, he argued that the court erred in failing to suppress a witness’ identification as the product of an impermissibly suggestive identification procedure.
Second, he argued that the court erred in allowing the prosecution to use a full-size reconstructed model or “mock-up” of the crime scene during two prosecution witnesses’ testimony and again during closing argument.
The Court of Appeals first concluded that the police’s placement of a suspect’s photograph in a particular position in a photo array, after the witness had selected a photograph in that position from a different photo array, does not render the identification procedure unduly suggestive.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress the identification evidence.
Next, the Court of Appeals concluded that the admission of any demonstrative aid, including the full-size mock-up of the crime scene at issue in this case, is governed by the four-part test articulated in People v. Douglas.
To be admissible under that test, the demonstrative aid must be authenticated, it must be relevant, it must be a fair and accurate representation of the evidence to which it relates, and its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Because the demonstrative aid satisfied the test for admissibility, the Court of Appeals concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecution to use the demonstrative aid during certain witness testimony and closing argument.
In the Interest of Black
Bernard Black, the former conservator of his mentally ill sister, appealed the probate court’s order finding that he breached his fiduciary duties and committed civil theft by converting his sister’s assets for his own benefit.
Construing section 15-14-423 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which allows a fiduciary to engage in a conflicted transaction under certain circumstances, a division of the Court of Appeals held that this provision applied only when the fiduciary has disclosed the conflict of interest and demonstrated that the conflicted transaction is nonetheless reasonable and fair to the protected person. Because Black did neither, he could not seek safe harbor under the statute.
The Court of Appeals also held that the probate court had jurisdiction to resolve the civil theft allegations and to impose civil theft damages, that Black had notice of the allegations against him and the remedies sought, and that the hearing was otherwise fair. Accordingly, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court’s order.
Town of Breckenridge v. Egencia
The Colorado Court of Appeals was asked to determine whether online travel companies are required to collect and remit accommodation and sales taxes to the Town of Breckenridge on hotel rooms they book through their respective internet websites.
On appeal, Breckenridge made five contentions. First, it contended that the district court erred in determining that the online travel companies were not “renters” or “lessors” for purposes of Breckenridge’s accommodation tax ordinance. Second, it contended that the district court misapplied the summary judgment standard by resolving material issues of fact.
Third, it contended that its sales tax claim should not have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Fourth, it contended that its motion for class action certification should have been granted because common questions predominate and class action was the superior method of relief. Fifth, it contended that its common law claims were improperly dismissed. The Court of Appeals considered and rejected each contention and concluded that they need not collect and remit such taxes.
Airth v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.
The Court of Appeals considered whether, under section 10-4-609 of the Colorado Revised Statutes an insurer’s statutorily mandated offer of enhanced uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage was, as a matter of law, sufficient and an insured must reject in writing an offer of enhanced UM/UIM coverage.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the offer was, as a matter of law, sufficient, even though it did not include any pricing information. And, interpreting section 10-4-609, the division concluded that a written rejection is only required if the insured declines the statutory minimum amount of UM/UIM coverage; a written rejection of enhanced UM/UIM coverage is not, then, required.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment entered on behalf of the insurer.
People in the Interest of M.R.M M.M.A., the mother, appealed from the order dismissing the dependency and neglect proceeding concerning the children, M.R.M., M.M.M., and M.A.M. The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that the order from which the mother sought to appeal was not a final and appealable order, and that because her notice of appeal was not filed within twenty-one days after the entry of the order that was final and appealable, her appeal was untimely. Therefore, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
People in the Interest of J.L.
J.C., the mother, appealed the judgment terminating the parent-child legal relationship with her children, S.M. and J.L. Mother’s third child, J.A., was named in the original proceeding but was not a subject of the appeal.
The record indicated that the trial court and the Alamosa County Department of Human Services did not comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S. Code section 1901-1963 and section 19- 1-126 of the Colorado revised Statutes.
Although the court’s belated inquiry revealed sufficient information to trigger Indian Child Welfare Act’s notice requirements, the Alamosa County Department of Human Services did not fulfill its duty in this regard.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals remand the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of ensuring that the Alamosa County Department of Human Services provides notice in accordance with the Indian Child Welfare Act.