Juarez v. People
Alfredo Juarez petitioned for review of the Court of Appeals’ judgment affirming the denial of his motion for postconviction relief. With regard to his challenge to the effectiveness of his counsel, the district court found both that defense counsel adequately advised his client concerning the immigration consequences of his plea of guilty to misdemeanor drug possession and that, in any event, there was no reasonable probability Juarez would not have taken the plea. The intermediate appellate court similarly found that counsel’s advice fell within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, but as a result of that finding, the appellate court considered it unnecessary to address the question whether counsel’s performance prejudiced Juarez.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that because Juarez conceded he was advised and understood that the misdemeanor offense to which he pleaded guilty would make him “deportable,” defense counsel’s advice concerning the immigration consequences of his plea correctly informed him of the controlling law and therefore did not fall below the objective standard of reasonableness required for effective assistance concerning immigration advice.
In re Chessin v. Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel
Paul Chessin is a former senior assistant attorney general who was involved in an investigation of an internet payday lending enterprise. Over the course of that investigation and contentious litigation that followed, Chessin came to believe that opposing counsel committed various violations of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. Chessin was dissatisfied with the decision of the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel not to pursue further investigation of his allegations of professional misconduct against opposing counsel, so he filed a complaint in district court seeking an order compelling regulation counsel to investigate the matter more fully. OARC moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Colorado Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over attorney discipline matters. After the district court issued an order holding OARC’s motion to dismiss in abeyance pending resolution of the complainant’s motion to disqualify OARC’s counsel, OARC petitioned the Supreme Court for relief.
The Supreme Court has long held that as part of its inherent powers, it has exclusive authority to regulate and supervise the practice of law in Colorado, including the structure and administration of attorney discipline proceedings. The court’s rules governing attorney discipline proceedings do not contemplate district court review of OARC intake decisions. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review Regulation Counsel’s decision not to proceed with an investigation into allegations of attorney misconduct. The Supreme Court therefore made the rule to show cause absolute.
People in Interest of A.R.
This case required the Colorado Supreme Court to decide a number of issues relating to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a dependency and neglect proceeding. The court first concluded that in a direct appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights, an appellate court may consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s performance at an adjudicatory hearing only when the party claiming ineffective assistance did not have a full and fair opportunity to assert such a claim immediately after his or her child was adjudicated dependent and neglected. Next, the court concluded that the proper test for prejudice in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a dependency and neglect proceeding is the test for prejudice set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466U.S. 668, 694 (1984). Accordingly, to establish prejudice from counsel’s deficient performance in a dependency and neglect proceeding, a party must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Last, the court concluded that an appellate court may vacate a juvenile court’s decision in a dependency and neglect proceeding on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel without remanding for further fact-finding when either the record is sufficiently developed to allow the appellate court to decide the question of counsel’s ineffectiveness or the record establishes presumptive prejudice under the standard set forth in United States v. Cronic, 466U.S. 648, 656–62 (1984).
Applying these determinations to the facts and claims before it, the court concluded that respondent mother had a full and fair opportunity to appeal the adjudication entered after the adjudicatory hearing and thus cannot now raise her claim that her counsel was ineffective at that hearing; has not established a basis for presuming prejudice in this case and has not shown that her counsel was ineffective in allowing the Pueblo County Department of Human Services to proceed by way of an offer of proof at the termination hearing; and has established that her counsel was ineffective in not properly litigating the issue of less drastic alternatives to termination and therefore a remand for further proceedings is warranted and appropriate.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the division, albeit on different grounds, and remanded this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
M.A.W. v. The People in Interest of A.L.W.
This case is a companion case to People in Interest of A.R., which was also decided on Feb. 10.
For the reasons discussed at length in A.R., the Supreme Court concluded that the proper test for prejudice in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a dependency and neglect proceeding is the test for prejudice set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466U.S. 668, 694 (1984), and not a fundamental fairness test. Accordingly, to establish prejudice from counsel’s deficient performance in a dependency and neglect proceeding, a party must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
The court further concluded that an appellate court may vacate a juvenile court’s decision in a dependency and neglect proceeding on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel without remanding for further fact-finding when either the record is sufficiently developed to allow the appellate court to decide the question of counsel’s ineffectiveness or the record establishes presumptive prejudice under the standard set forth in United States v. Cronic, 466U.S. 648, 656–62 (1984). Applying these principles here, the Supreme Court concluded that the juvenile court correctly applied Strickland’s prejudice prong to the father’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims and that the court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting those claims.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment terminating the father’s parental rights.