Editor’s Note: Law Week Colorado edits court opinion summaries for style and, when necessary, length.
Rodney McDonald v. People
In 1996, a jury convicted Rodney McDonald of attempted first-degree murder, second-degree assault, possession of a weapon by a previous offender and two habitual criminal counts. The habitual criminal counts were triggered by the attempted first-degree murder conviction and based on two prior felony convictions: a 1995 conviction for possession of a schedule II controlled substance (a class 4 felony) and a 1994 conviction for conspiracy to commit menacing (a class 6 felony). The court sentenced McDonald to 72 years in prison. The judgment of conviction became final in 1999.
McDonald sought a proportionality review of his sentence in 2007. The district court concluded that McDonald’s sentence wasn’t grossly disproportionate to the crime for which he was convicted, and a division of the court of appeals affirmed.
Over a decade later, the Colorado Supreme Court announced its opinion in Wells-Yates v. People, which altered the proportionality-review process in Colorado. McDonald moved for a second proportionality review, asserting that his sentence was illegal and was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights under the new rules announced in Wells-Yates.
The district court denied McDonald’s motion, concluding that he wasn’t entitled to a second review because he hadn’t “demonstrated the rules announced in Wells-Yates have been ‘applied retroactively by the United States Supreme Court or Colorado [a]ppellate [c]ourts.’”
On appeal, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals held that, “to the extent Wells-Yates announced new constitutional rules, those rules are procedural and don’t apply retroactively”; thus, “the district court properly denied McDonald’s motion.”
The Colorado Supreme Court granted McDonald’s petition for certiorari review of the division’s opinion.
McDonald asked the state’s high court to apply the holdings it announced in Wells-Yates v. People retroactively to his case, which is more than 25 years old. Doing so would allow for a second, more in-depth proportionality review of his sentence.
The court concluded that Wells-Yates didn’t announce new substantive rules of constitutional law, so Wells-Yates’s holdings don’t apply retroactively to cases like McDonald’s on collateral review.
David Ward v. People
In 1993, a jury convicted David Ward of robbery (a class 4 felony), aggravated robbery (a class 3 felony) and three habitual criminal counts. The habitual criminal counts were based on two prior felony convictions: a 1987 conviction for offering violence to a correctional officer in Missouri and a 1981 conviction for second-degree burglary in Colorado. The trial court sentenced Ward to life imprisonment.
Ward appealed, and the division affirmed his convictions for robbery and aggravated robbery but remanded the case to the trial court to consider whether Ward had demonstrated justifiable excuse or excusable neglect for his untimely challenge to the prior convictions upon which his habitual criminal convictions were predicated.
On remand, the trial court found no justifiable excuse or excusable neglect and affirmed Ward’s habitual criminal counts. Ward appealed that decision, and the division again affirmed Ward’s convictions and sentence. Ward’s convictions became final in 1999.
In 2020, Ward filed a pro se motion requesting a proportionality review of his sentence under Wells-Yates v. People. The postconviction court concluded Ward’s claims were time-barred. On appeal, the division concluded that “Wells-Yates didn’t create a new substantive constitutional rule that applies retroactively . . . [; it] changed only the process for conducting an extended proportionality review.”
Accordingly, it concluded that Ward’s collateral attack was untimely. The Colorado Supreme Court then granted Ward’s petition for certiorari review.
Ward asked the court to retroactively apply the holdings it announced in Wells-Yates, which altered proportionality review for habitual criminal sentences. Consistent with the companion case Rodney McDonald v. People, the high court held that Wells-Yates didn’t announce new substantive rules of constitutional law, so Wells-Yates’s holdings don’t apply retroactively to cases like Ward’s on collateral review.
Rehearing Order – Mercy Housing Management Group Inc, v. Naomi Bermudez
Upon consideration of Naomi Bermudez’s petition for rehearing, which she filed following the announcement of the Colorado Supreme Court’s opinion in this case on Oct. 21, and the responses submitted by Mercy Housing Management Group Inc. and the Denver County Court, and being sufficiently advised in the premises.
The Oct. 21 opinion was premised on the court’s belief that Bermudez was personally served and that this case was governed by Section 13-40-115(2) of the Colorado Revised Statutes. Bermudez’s petition for rehearing informed the court for the first time that she was served by posting and was not personally served, and therefore, Section 13-40-115(1) Subsection (1) rather than Subsection (2), controls in this case.
Bermudez contended, however, that Subsections (1) and (2) both confer a jury-trial right in forcible entry and detainer, or FED, actions for possession. Bermudez requested that the Colorado Supreme Court conclude that she’s entitled to a jury trial under Subsection (1).
Because the Oct. 21 opinion rested on a factual premise that the court has now been advised was inaccurate, the court granted the petition for rehearing in part, withdrew its Oct. 21 opinion and discharged without an opinion the May 17 order to show cause.