Editor’s Note: Law Week Colorado edits court opinion summaries for style and, when necessary, length.
Franktown Citizens Coalition v. Independence Water
This case concerns Independence Water and Sanitation District’s application to amend its augmentation plan for not-nontributary groundwater in the Denver Basin by adding uses for the augmented water to the plan. Franktown Citizens Coalition II Inc. and West Elbert County Well Users Association opposed Independence’s application, arguing that the proposed amendment to the augmentation plan didn’t comply with the anti-speculation doctrine.
The water court for Water Division 1 concluded that the anti-speculation doctrine was inapplicable and issued a final judgment and decree approving Independence’s application.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that the water court didn’t err in declining to apply the anti-speculation doctrine to Independence’s application to amend its augmentation plan for not-nontributary groundwater in the Denver Basin for two reasons.
First, applying the anti-speculation doctrine to applications to obtain or amend an augmentation plan wouldn’t make sense because the anti-speculation doctrine doesn’t advance the purpose of an augmentation plan: to permit out-of-priority diversions provided that diverters demonstrate that they will not injure existing water rights.
Second, in reviewing an application to obtain or amend an augmentation plan, the water court need only determine whether the plan will injuriously affect existing water rights. Answering this question doesn’t require applying the anti-speculation doctrine.
Because the water court properly found that Independence’s amended augmentation plan will not result in injury, the Supreme Court affirmed the water court’s judgment and decree.
Adam Densmore v. People
In February 2017, Adam Densmore lived in Boulder with his 13-month-old child and the child’s mother, Ashley Mead. After Mead didn’t arrive for work one day, her employer called the police.
At the time, Densmore and the child were in Oklahoma, where Densmore was arrested by Oklahoma law enforcement officers. Because Densmore had the child with him when he was arrested and the child had no other adult caregivers, the police called the Oklahoma Department of Human Services and asked the department to take custody of the child. At that point, a child welfare specialist in the department’s child welfare division got involved.
The child welfare specialist wasn’t a law enforcement officer, and her job description didn’t include any specific law enforcement activities or criminal investigations. Rather, her job involved investigating the safety of children and reporting information that could endanger a child’s welfare.
In performing these duties, she frequently interviewed people who were incarcerated. When she conducted such interviews, her purpose was to determine what brought a child to the department’s attention and the steps necessary to maintain the child’s safety. When interviewing someone who was incarcerated, she asked questions concerning substance abuse, domestic violence, family support, discipline, parenting styles, child placement options and services that the incarcerated parent might need.
Ultimately, she sought to determine the least restrictive placement for the child, prioritizing placing the child with a family member, if possible, rather than in foster care.
She asked Densmore about the child’s allergies, her likes and dislikes, how to comfort her, how she was disciplined, parenting techniques, substance abuse, domestic violence and support systems for the family.
An audio/video recording system recorded her interview of Densmore, as well as Densmore’s interactions with law enforcement officers following that interview. At the conclusion of the interview, it appears that both the child welfare specialist and an FBI agent obtained discs containing the video recording. It further appears that the recording was subsequently shared with the Boulder Police Department.
Densmore was ultimately charged with first-degree murder of Mead, tampering with a deceased human body, tampering with physical evidence and abuse of a corpse.
The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether Miranda v. Arizona applies when a Department of Human Services caseworker conducts a custodial interrogation.
The court concluded that, in determining whether a caseworker acted as an agent of law enforcement in interviewing a person who was in custody, such that Miranda warnings were required, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances, including both objective and subjective factors.
Applying that standard to the facts presented, the court concluded that the caseworker who interviewed Densmore didn’t act as an agent of law enforcement when she spoke with him and, therefore, she was not required to provide Miranda warnings before conducting the interviews.
The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals division.
Patrick Frazee v. People
In a companion case to Densmore v. People, and following the principles set forth in Densmore, the court concluded that the Department of Human Services caseworker in this case was neither a law enforcement officer nor an agent of law enforcement for Miranda purposes.
Accordingly, Miranda doesn’t apply in this case, and the court need not reach the question of whether Miranda’s test for custody should apply when a Department of Human Services caseworker questions someone in pretrial detention about the facts underlying their custody.
Patrick Frazee was arrested in connection with the Nov. 22, 2018, murder of his romantic partner, Kelsey Berreth.
Frazee and Berreth had a daughter who was just over one year old at the time of Berreth’s death. On the day of Frazee’s arrest in December 2018, the Teller County Department of Human Services received a referral from the Woodland Park Police Department concerning the child. This referral was assigned to the child and family services administrator with the department, and, in this instance, she agreed to serve as a caseworker. The child was brought to the department’s office, and a court granted the department emergency custody of her.
The child services administrator met with Frazee at the Teller County jail twice. No law enforcement authorities asked the child services administrator to conduct her second meeting, and she didn’t notify the local police that she was doing so.
The meeting took place the day before a preliminary protective proceeding concerning the child was scheduled to occur. As of this time, Frazee had not yet been formally charged with Berreth’s murder. Law enforcement officers had told the child services administrator what they believed had happened, although they didn’t provide details and she didn’t have access to any search or arrest warrants that had been issued in the case.
She met with Frazee in the jail’s video advisement room, which is used for, among other things, video advisements, video court sessions, attorney visits and other official visits, such as the one at issue here. A deputy brought Frazee into the room, but the deputy did not stay, and the child services administrator was alone with Frazee during the meeting. Frazee was neither handcuffed nor restrained, nor did the child services administrator limit his freedom of movement during the meeting.
Frazee was free to leave at any time. The child services administrator, who was not a law enforcement officer and who had never been trained in law enforcement interrogation techniques, didn’t provide Miranda warnings to Frazee.
At the outset of the meeting, the child services administrator explained to Frazee that due to his incarceration, the child didn’t have an appropriate caregiver and that she had questions for Frazee regarding that issue. The child services administrator expressly told Frazee that she would understand if there were questions that he didn’t want to answer due to the allegations against him and the ongoing criminal investigation.
She also told Frazee that she was there to complete her assessment of the family and to gather information about the child that she needed in order to complete the paperwork for the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.
In particular, she explained that she “needed to learn about [Frazee’s] background growing up, about [the child’s] development, if she had any medical issues, you know, what was her daily schedule, how was her development, different things like that.”
The child services administrator also asked about Berreth, Frazee’s relationship with her and the custody arrangement that they had regarding the child, so that she could understand what the child’s daily life was like, whom she was with and when and her relationship with both of her parents. She went through a list of 14 standardized questions that she and her colleagues use to compile a child’s family history and to complete an assessment.
In response to her questions, Frazee described how he and Berreth met, and he provided context and background on their relationship. He also provided background information on himself, his upbringing, his family and his childhood, as well as some information on Berreth’s relationship with his family, among other things, before they discussed the timeframe when Berreth went missing.
After the meeting ended, the child services administrator documented what she had learned in a referral/assessment summary. Pursuant to a release that Frazee had signed during one of her two meetings with him, she shared her assessment documentation with both the district attorney’s and public defender’s offices.
The criminal case against Frazee proceeded, and prior to trial, the People endorsed the child services administrator as a witness. Frazee moved to suppress all of the statements that he had made at his December meeting with her, arguing that the meeting was a custodial interrogation conducted without the requisite Miranda warnings. Frazee asserted that the admission of his statements would violate his constitutional rights.
The court concluded that the child services administrator had no legal duty to provide Frazee with a Miranda advisement or warning.
A jury ultimately found Frazee guilty of first-degree murder after deliberation, felony murder, three counts of solicitation to commit first-degree murder and tampering with a deceased human body.