Editor’s Note: Law Week Colorado edits court opinion summaries for style and, when necessary, length.
The Colorado Supreme Court en banc unanimously affirmed a judgment involving a driving under the influence arrest.
According to the Colorado Supreme Court opinion, Charles McLaughlin was charged with felony driving under the influence, among other counts, after police responded to a call and located him in a parking lot near his truck. McLaughlin’s defense was that he hadn’t been driving.
At trial, the prosecution introduced a video of the interaction between the arresting officer and McLaughlin, but they edited the video to omit statements McLaughlin made to the officer alleging an unidentified woman was the driver of the vehicle. McLaughlin wanted to introduce those statements under the rule of completeness, arguing the redacted video created a misleading impression.
A trial court ruled McLaughlin’s statements were self-serving hearsay and not admissible under the rule of completeness. The court further found McLaughlin’s statements about the unidentified woman weren’t admissible unless he testified, which would subject him to impeachment with his prior felony convictions under Colorado Rule of Evidence 806. McLaughlin declined to testify and his statements about the unidentified woman weren’t admitted. A jury found him guilty.
After McLaughlin appealed, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed McLaughlin’s convictions holding self-serving hearsay is admissible under the rule of completeness and statements from a defendant-declarant admitted under the rule are not subject to impeachment.
The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the appeals court. It held under Rule 106, if the prosecution creates a misleading impression by excluding a defendant’s statements that in fairness ought to be considered contemporaneously with the proffered evidence, then the rule of completeness requires the prosecution to introduce such statements. The high court also held that when a defendant-declarant’s statements are admitted under the rule of completeness, the prosecution cannot impeach the defendant-declarant under Rule 806.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court’s judgment.
Aurora Public Schools et al. v. A.S. et al.
The Colorado Supreme Court en banc unanimously affirmed an order in a case related to the Child Sexual Abuse Accountability Act.
According to the high court opinion, the CSAAA created a statutory cause of action for a victim of sexual misconduct that occurred while the victim was a minor participating in a youth-related activity or program. Under the act, a victim can bring a civil claim for damages against both the actor who committed the abuse and the organization that operated or managed the youth-related activity or program, if the organization knew or should have known about the risk of sexual misconduct.
The CSAAA established a three-year window where a victim can bring claims under the act for child sexual abuse between Jan. 1, 1960, and Jan. 1, 2022, regardless of whether previously available causes of action were time-barred. The act also waived governmental immunity for claims brought under it.
According to the opinion, in January 2022, A.S. and her husband B.S. brought a claim under the CSAAA against former high school athletic coach David O’Neill and Aurora Public Schools alleging the coach sexually abused A.S. between 2001-2005 when she was a minor. When the plaintiffs brought the suit, any previously available claims for alleged sexual misconduct were time-barred.
The defendant’s each moved to dismiss the complaint under Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) arguing the CSAAA violates the Colorado Constitution’s prohibition on retrospective legislation. The trial court granted the motions, holding Colorado Revised Statute 13-20-1202 is unconstitutionally retrospective as applied to the claim under the CSAAA in this case.
A.S. and B.S. appealed. The school district filed a motion under CRS 13-4-110(1)(a) to transfer jurisdiction from the appeals court to the Colorado Supreme Court. The Colorado Supreme Court denied the motion, but granted leave to seek certiorari review under Colorado Appellate Rule 50. The school district filed a C.A.R. 50 petition, which O’Neill joined and the high court granted.
The Colorado Supreme Court was asked whether the CSAAA violates the Colorado Constitution’s retrospectivity clause and specifically is the CSAAA unconstitutionally retrospective to the extent it creates a new cause of action for conduct that predates the act and for which any previously available claims would be time-barred? The Colorado Supreme Court contended the answer is yes.
The high court held the CSAAA creates a new cause of action for child sexual abuse, the act creates a new obligation and attaches a new disability with respect to past transactions or considerations to the extent it permits victims to bring claims for which any previously available cause of action would be time-barred.
The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the CSAAA amounts to unconstitutional retrospective legislation as applied to the plaintiffs’ claim under the act against the defendants in this case.
The high court affirmed the district court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The Colorado Supreme Court en banc made a rule absolute in a case involving the term “capital offenses.”
Prosecutors charged Jerrelle Smith by complaint and information with one count of first-degree murder for an offense he allegedly committed in October 2021. Prosecutors asked the district court to issue an arrest warrant and later that day, an Adams County district magistrate did, finding there was probable cause for the warrant, the warrant was to issue with no bond until seen by a judge and Smith didn’t qualify for a 48-hour bond hearing. Smith was arrested on the warrant and remained in custody without bail since his arrest.
Months after Smith’s arrest, the district court held a preliminary hearing where prosecutors requested the court order Smith held without bail for the pendency of the case. Smith’s counsel responded that Smith was entitled to bail notwithstanding section 19(1)(a) of the Colorado Constitution, which authorizes a district court to deny bail if the proof is evident or the presumption is great a capital offense has been committed and its statutory analogue CRS 16-4-101(1)(a) providing all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for capital offenses where the presumption is great or the proof is evident.
The counsel reasoned Smith is “not subject to the death penalty, which is the definition of a capital offense,” and “[c]apital offenses no longer exist in the state of Colorado, since the death penalty was repealed in March of 2020.”
The counsel argued Smith should have a bond set. The court held murder is still classified as a capital offense, in spite of the state not having the death penalty. The court denied Smith’s request for bail.
Smith filed a petition for review with the Colorado Court of Appeals and argued the district court abused its discretion and violated Smith’s constitutional right to bail by refusing to set it. The appeals court issued a single-sentence order dismissing the petition.
Smith petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court and the high court issued a rule to show cause.
The Colorado Supreme Court found the term “capital offenses” as it appears in section 19(1)(a) plainly refers to offenses for which a statute authorizes the imposition of the death penalty and the general assembly abolished the death penalty as a punishment for offenses (like Smith’s alleged offense here) charged on or after July 1, 2020. The high court concluded the district court abused its discretion when it treated Smith’s charge of first-degree murder as a capital offense and denied Smith’s request for bail.
In that light, the high court found it need not address the propriety of the appeals court’s order dismissing Smith’s appeal.
The high court made the rule to show cause absolute.
Justice Carlos Samour specially concurred.
“I concur fully with the majority’s opinion. I write separately, however, for two reasons,” Samour wrote. “First, to flag for the legislature that it may wish to review any statutory provisions that reference ‘capital offenses’ or an iteration of that term. Second, to alert judges and lawyers to the potential ramifications of today’s decision beyond an accused’s right to bail.”
The Colorado Supreme Court en banc unanimously affirmed a judgment involving double jeopardy in a murder case.
According to the Colorado Supreme Court opinion, Rafael Garcia was accused of murdering his estranged wife’s neighbor in Palisade, Colorado, in 1989. Garcia fled to Mexico and after an unsuccessful extradition back to the state, the Mesa County District Attorney’s Office compiled a casebook and sent it to Mexican authorities. In 2009, Garcia was tried for the murder in Mexico and was acquitted in that jurisdiction. In 2016, when Garcia returned to Colorado, he was arrested, tried for murder and convicted.
Garcia appealed and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. The appeals court held Garcia’s trial wasn’t barred by double jeopardy and decided CRS 18-1-303(1) doesn’t bar prosecution in Colorado after a prior prosecution in a foreign country.
Garcia petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court which it granted.
The high court held Garcia’s Colorado trial wasn’t barred by double jeopardy because 18-1-303 doesn’t prohibit prosecution in Colorado following a prosecution in a foreign country. The court held cooperative law enforcement alone is an insufficient ground on which to claim that one sovereign acted as a tool for another. The high court further found the dual sovereignty exception to double jeopardy applied here to permit Garcia’s prosecution in Colorado.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.
The Colorado Supreme Court en banc affirmed a judgment involving hearsay.
According to the Colorado Supreme Court opinion, L.S. accused Jacob Vanderpauye of sexually assaulting her and he was charged.
Vanderpauye filed a pretrial motion seeking to admit into evidence an alleged statement he made to L.S.: “I thought you said I could do anything to you.” Prosecutors didn’t deny Vanderpauye made the statement, but opposed the request. The district court denied the motion.
The jury wasn’t able to reach a verdict on the sexual assault (incapable of appraising), but it returned a guilty verdict on sexual assault (physically helpless). The court sentenced Vanderpauye to sex offender intensive supervision probation for an indeterminate term with a minimum of 20 years and a potential maximum of the rest of his life.
Vanderpauye appealed and the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed. The appeals court held neither the Colorado Rules of Evidence nor our court’s jurisprudence can support “a per se rule prohibiting the admission of self-serving hearsay by a criminal defendant.”
The appeals court concluded a criminal defendant’s self-serving hearsay is admissible, subject to principles contained in CRE 403, only if that statement satisfies a hearsay-rule exception in the rules of evidence.
The appeals court also held Vanderpauye’s alleged statement was admissible under the excited utterance exception in CRE 803(2). The appeals court ruled the district court erred in excluding the alleged statement. The appeals court determined the error wasn’t harmless and remanded the case for a new trial.
Prosecutors sought review from the Colorado Supreme Court which granted the petition.
The Colorado Supreme Court clarified that Colorado law has no per se rule excluding a self-serving hearsay statement by a criminal defendant. The high court held, like any other hearsay statement, a defendant’s self-serving hearsay statement could be admissible if it satisfies a hearsay-rule exception in the Colorado Rules of Evidence.
The high court found the self-serving nature of a defendant’s hearsay statement, while not grounds for automatic exclusion, could be relevant in some cases to the determination of whether the statement fits within the scope of a hearsay exception in CRE 803.
The Colorado Supreme Court explained of particular interest here, under the excited utterance exception in CRE 803(2), the self-serving nature of the defendant’s hearsay statement could be probative of whether the statement was a spontaneous reaction, rendering it potentially admissible, or the result of reflective thought, rendering it inadmissible.
The high court further concluded regardless of whether the self-serving nature of a defendant’s hearsay statement affects the statement’s admissibility under the particular hearsay exception in play, the trial court should consider that aspect of the statement in exercising its discretion under CRE 403.
The Colorado Supreme Court found the district court incorrectly found the self-serving nature of Vanderpauye’s alleged hearsay statement rendered it automatically inadmissible, further finding the district court erred in alternatively ruling the excluded alleged statement didn’t meet the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule under CRE 803(2).
The Colorado Supreme Court found Vanderpauye’s alleged statement, though self-serving, was admissible under the excited utterance exception. The high court ruled the alleged statement satisfied the CRE 403 balancing test.
The high court further found the district court’s error in excluding the alleged statement wasn’t harmless. The Court of Appeals’ judgment reversing the conviction and remanding for a new trial was affirmed.
Chief Justice Brian Boatright was joined by Justice Melissa Hart in dissent.
“The bottom line is that nothing about what Vanderpauye said has the required trustworthiness that warrants an exception to the rule prohibiting hearsay,” Boatright wrote. “Hence, I do not believe that the statement in question is an excited utterance, much less that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the statement. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.”