Editor’s Note: Law Week Colorado edits court opinion summaries for style and, when necessary, length.
This case involves a dispute under the Colorado Open Records Act. The Colorado Sun and 9News requested records under CORA from Amanda Brubaker, the records custodian for the Colorado Department of Human Services, showing the total number of child abuse reports received over a three-year period from certain residential childcare facilities in Colorado. DHS denied the requests, citing a provision of the Colorado Children’s Code that prohibits disclosure, subject to statutorily enumerated exceptions, of child abuse reports as well as “the name and address of any child, family, or informant or any other identifying information contained in such reports.” According to DHS, disclosure of the aggregated information would necessarily reveal the address of a child or informant contained in a child abuse report, as the requests were linked to specific addresses — the address of each residential care facility.
On judicial review of DHS’s denial, the district court entered judgment in favor of DHS, and the media organizations appealed.
The appeals court needed to determine whether section 19-1-307(1)(a) of the state’s revised statutes prohibits, under all circumstances, the disclosure of any address contained in a child abuse report or whether the statute prohibits disclosure of an address only when the address constitutes “identifying information” — information that could lead to the identification of a particular child, family or informant.
The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded the statute is ambiguous. To break the impasse, it turned to the legislative history of section 19-1-307(1)(a) and the possible consequences of adopting either construction. In its view, the evolution of the statutory provision at issue demonstrates the General Assembly intended to keep confidential only information that could reveal a person’s or family’s identity, and the possible consequences of adopting either interpretation reinforces this conclusion. The appeals court adopted the media organizations’ interpretation of the statute.
As a result, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
On remand, the district court must determine whether, in light of the opinion, the requested records would disclose “identifying information” of a child, family or informant associated with a child abuse or neglect report.
Judge Neeti Pawar dissented.
“According to the majority, section 19-1-307(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023, is ambiguous because there are two reasonable ways to read it. I think there is only one,” wrote Pawar. “In my view, the only reasonable reading is that names and addresses in child abuse reports are always confidential and protected from disclosure. I would therefore affirm the district court’s ruling based on the plain language of the statute without resorting to additional aids of statutory interpretation.”
Adrian Salazar appealed his conviction of several offenses based on his sexual abuse of two children. Among other offenses, he was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust. On appeal, Salazar contended the trial court’s jury instructions were erroneous because they failed to apply the culpable mental state of this offense to the element he occupied a position of trust with respect to the children.
The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed and held the culpable mental state doesn’t apply to the position of trust element. Because the appeals court rejected Salazar’s other challenges to the judgment, it affirmed.
After evaluation, the appeals court also concluded the prosecutor’s conduct “[didn’t] warrant the drastic remedy of reversal under the plain error standard.”
Peter Bianco appealed the district court’s entry of judgment on the jury’s award of damages for pre-majority medical expenses to Alexander Rudnicki. Bianco contended the court erred by awarding prefiling, prejudgment interest on those damages from the date Rudnicki was born (the date of injury) rather than the date the Colorado Supreme Court determined he was entitled to recover such expenses in Rudnicki v. Bianco; and resulting in a total award in excess of the $1 million damages limitation under the Health Care Availability Act in section 13-64-302(1)(b) of the state’s revised statutes.
Bianco contended because Rudnicki wasn’t entitled to recover his pre-majority medical expenses as a measure of damages until Rudnicki abolished the common law rule precluding such recovery, interest should accrue from the date of the Colorado Supreme Court’s ruling rather than from the date of Rudnicki’s birth.
Based on the plain language of sections 13-21-101(1) and 13-80-108(1), the Colorado Court of Appeals concluded Rudnicki is entitled to collect prefiling, prejudgment interest on his pre-majority medical expenses from the date his cause of action accrued, which was the date of his birth.
According to the opinion, the appeals court generally agreed with the rationale of Scholle v. Ehrichs, which held “prefiling, prejudgment interest is part of ‘damages’ capped under the HCAA, subject to being uncapped upon a showing of good cause and unfairness.” Prefiling, prejudgment interest on Rudnicki’s pre-majority medical expenses is a part of his past and future economic damages. The district court found the requisite good cause and unfairness to award past and future economic damages exceeding the HCAA damages limitation.
The appeals court concluded Rudnicki was entitled to prefiling, prejudgment interest on his pre-majority medical expenses from the date of his birth, without limitation.