Editor’s Note: Law Week Colorado edits court opinion summaries for style and, when necessary, length.
A division of the Colorado Court of Appeals considered two sections of the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act and concluded that sex offenders who are subject to the act’s lifetime registration requirement are nonetheless eligible to file a petition to discontinue registration.
Decades ago, Maurice Peter Warren pleaded guilty to first-degree sexual assault, subjecting him to mandatory lifetime sex offender registration under the act. Many years later, Warren filed a petition to discontinue sex offender registration under state law, which provides that “[n]otwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary,” a registrant may file a petition to discontinue registration if the registrant “suffers from a severe physical or intellectual disability to the extent that” the person is “permanently incapacitated and does not present an unreasonable risk to public safety.”
After the prosecution objected, the district court denied Warren’s petition to discontinue registration without a hearing.
The questions before the appeals court were whether the law Warren filed his petition under applies to individuals who are subject to mandatory lifetime sex offender registration and, if so, whether the district court erred by denying Warren’s petition without a hearing.
Based on the act’s plain language, the Court of Appeals held that Warren is eligible to petition to discontinue sex offender registration and that the district court erred by denying his petition without a hearing.
The appeals court reversed and remanded the case.
As matters of first impression, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals resolved several issues arising under the state’s statute governing the early dismissal of strategic lawsuits against public participation, commonly known as the anti-SLAPP statute.
First, the division determined that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to actions in county court. Special motions to dismiss under the statute may be filed in and resolved by county courts. Second, the division determined that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to forcible entry and detainer actions, as long as the actions arise from protected speech or petitioning in connection with a public issue. Third, the division determined that all appeals from rulings on special motions to dismiss — even those coming from county court — are to be filed in the Court of Appeals. Fourth, the division determined that the anti-SLAPP statute isn’t confined to defamation and related tort claims but applies to any type of claim that arises from protected speech or petitioning in connection with a public issue. Finally, reaching the merits of the appeal, the division concluded that the county court erred in its assessment of the special motion to dismiss.
The division reversed the county court’s order denying the motion and remanded the case with directions.
Foothills v. Board of County Commissioners
According to the Colorado Court of Appeals opinion, this is the first reported Colorado case to consider whether Section 32-1-107 of the Colorado Revised Statutes applies to a request for inclusion of property made by an existing special district.
Foothills Park and Recreation District appealed the district court’s judgment affirming the decision of the Board of County Commissioners of Jefferson County, denying Foothills’ requests to include property in its service area, dismissing its claim for declaratory judgment and denying its request for injunctive relief. Foothills also appealed the district court’s order denying its motion to supplement the record.
A division of the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The division held that Section 32-1-107 applies to an existing district’s request to include property that is already located within another special district that is authorized to provide the same type of services as the district requesting the inclusion.