Editor’s Note: Law Week Colorado edits court opinion summaries for style and, when necessary, length.
Laura Anzalone, an elected trustee, was publicly censured by the board of trustees of the Town of Del Norte due to her alleged misconduct. Anzalone sued Del Norte and the board, alleging the censure was void because it constituted a formal action taken in violation of the Colorado Open Meetings Law. The district court disagreed and dismissed her claim. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals agreed with Anzalone and reversed.
Anzalone alleged in October 2021 the town’s mayor informed her he had received unspecified complaints about her behavior and he “had the votes to remove her from office,” according to the opinion. Subsequent events revealed the alleged misconduct arose from her interactions with the public concerning code enforcement issues, her attempt to call a special meeting of the board and her communications with town employees concerning best timing for staff replacement.
At the board’s regular public meeting on Oct. 13, 2021, the board scheduled a public hearing for Nov. 2, 2021, to address the possible removal of Anzalone from her position. Two days later, the mayor requested a special meeting of the board, which was set for Oct. 18, 2021. The notice setting the meeting included the agenda, which contained items relating to Anzalone’s removal.
Five trustees, the town attorney, town clerk, code enforcement officer, treasurer and police chief attended the special meeting. Anzalone didn’t attend. After 40 minutes in open session, the board approved a motion to convene an executive session. After exiting the executive session and returning to the public hearing, a trustee read aloud a written motion to censure Anzalone.
After the motion was read, the attorney suggested additional grounds to support the first allegation of misconduct. The board agreed and unanimously approved the amended motion for censure. The board then canceled the November public hearing.
Anzalone sued, claiming, among other things, the censure violated COML. The town and board moved to dismiss the claim. The district court denied the motion, rejecting the argument that the approval of a censure can never trigger the provisions of COML.
Anzalone then filed a motion for summary judgment. She requested the district court find the town and board violated COML by approving the censure in executive session. The town opposed the motion. It argued the censure didn’t involve the town and board’s policy-making authority. The district court agreed with the town and denied the summary judgment on the grounds Anzalone didn’t demonstrate a link between the censure and the policy-making powers of the town and board.
The district court then requested briefs from the parties, and issued a written order denying Anzalone’s COML claim after review. The appeals court treated the decision as a grant of summary judgment in favor of the town and board on the COML claim. Anzalone appealed.
The appeals court concluded the censure resolution constituted a formal action of the board and part of its policy-making function, and, as a result, it was subject to COML. The appeals court also concluded the board exercised its policy-making process during the executive session based on the facts presented to the district court.
The appeals court judged the censure invalid as a matter of law, and concluded the district court erred when it dismissed Anzalone’s claim to invalidate the censure resolution under COML.
Based on this reasoning, the appeals court ruled Anzalone entitled to an order declaring the censure resolution invalid and she is entitled to an award of her costs and attorney fees incurred in pursuing the COML claim.
The appeals court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the district court to enter an order declaring the censure resolution invalid and to determine the amount of Anzalone’s reasonable attorney fees and costs.
On Nov. 30, 2021, Skylan Brassill stole a motorcycle and crashed it into a fence. Multiple criminal charges were filed against him. Brassill was arrested in March 2022 and pleaded guilty to first-degree aggravated motor vehicle theft and vehicular eluding on July 21, 2022. The guilty plea didn’t mention restitution.
Pursuant to the district court’s order, the prosecution was required to file information regarding the specific amount of claimed restitution by Aug. 20, 2022. The prosecution didn’t abide by the deadline and provided the information for the first time on Sep. 13, 2022, when the prosecution filed its restitution motion.
Brassill objected to the restitution request and asserted the prosecution was required to request an amount of restitution at sentencing unless the information supporting the request was unavailable. Brassill also argued the prosecution was required to, but didn’t, make diligent efforts to ensure the information was available at sentencing, the opinion noted. Brassill requested the district court deny restitution or set a hearing. The district court set a hearing.
At the hearing, the district court stated any future violation of its orders setting deadlines for the filing of the restitution request would result in the summary denial of the request. But the court noted Section 18-1.3-603 of the Colorado Revised Statutes provided 91 days to enter a restitution order and since only 90 days had passed, it excused the tardy filing for “this one time only.” The district court denied Brassill’s motion to reconsider the restitution order. Brassill appealed.
Brassill argued the restitution order violates Section 18-1.3-603 and the Colorado Supreme Court ruling in People v. Weeks. Brassill also noted the prosecution failed to comply with the court’s order requiring it to disclose the amount of requested restitution within 30 days. Based on these arguments, Brassill asserted the district court erred by approving the restitution order.
The appeals court agreed the restitution statute requires the prosecution to exercise reasonable diligence to determine the amount of restitution and present it to the court at or before the sentence hearing. The appeals court concluded the district court erred when it declined to recognize that obligation.
The appeals court also determined the prosecutor didn’t use reasonable diligence to determine the amount of restitution before sentencing.
On the matter of the district court’s scheduling order setting a 30-day deadline, the appeals court concluded the district court acted within its discretion and complied with the Colorado Supreme Court’s directive in Weeks. The appeals court rejected the people’s argument the district court lacked authority to enter an order requiring the prosecution to submit the specific amount of restitution within 30 days of sentencing.
But the appeals court concluded the violation of the scheduling order didn’t deprive the district court of the authority to resolve restitution.
The appeals court affirmed the order.