People v. Lujan
After Abel Lujan was charged with first-degree murder of his girlfriend, the trial court read a limiting instruction, telling the jury it could only consider some evidence presented at the trial for the purposes of establishing Lujan’s motive, intent or common plan. A copy of this instruction was not given to the jury for deliberations; however, the jury did receive an instruction at the close of the evidence explaining that certain evidence could only be considered for the limited purposes for which it was admitted.
While the jury was deliberating, it submitted a question asking for clarification about the limiting instruction and, over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court cleared the courtroom, leaving only the judge, bailiff and court reporter; the judge then brought in the jury and reread the limiting instruction that it had previously read twice in open court.
The jury ultimately found Lujan guilty of second-degree murder. Lujan appealed, arguing that the court’s actions when rereading the jury instruction constituted a courtroom closure that violated his 6th Amendment right to a public trial.
A division of the Court of Appeals agreed, reversing Lujan’s conviction and remanding the case for a new trial. The People argued to the Colorado Supreme Court that the brief courtroom closure was trivial and therefore did not violate Lujan’s public trial right.
The court agreed adopting a triviality standard is appropriate in Colorado. After applying the standard, the court held that the courtroom closure in this case was trivial because it did not undermine the purposes of the public trial right guaranteed by the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions and did not violate Lujan’s rights. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that court to address Lujan’s remaining objections on appeal.
Santa Maria Reservoir Co. v. Warner
Jim Warner argued that the Water Court applied the wrong legal standard in determining the water the Santa Maria Reservoir Company diverts from the Rio Grande into the Closed Basin is imported.
He contended the water court’s imported-water determination was based on its mistaken conclusion that the Rio Grande and the Closed Basin are “unconnected” stream systems.
According to Warner, the two stream systems are hydraulically connected, and the Water Court’s contrary finding ignores its own legal precedent and the Colorado Supreme Court’s case law. Warner posited the Water Court’s decree is inconsistent with the General Assembly’s efforts to manage the surface and groundwater systems in the San Luis Valley.
The Colorado Supreme Court concluded Warner was not injured by the Water Court’s approval of the change-of-use application submitted by SMRC with respect to the water it diverts from the Rio Grande into the Closed Basin. Because that water is imported water, SMRC is entitled to fully consume all of it. The water would not be in the Closed Basin, much less available for use by Warner and other water users in the Closed Basin, without its importation by SMRC. Thus, rather than cause an injury to Warner, the approval of SMRC’s application simply revealed to him that his past use of return flows from SMRC’s imported water in the Closed Basin was a benefit to which he had no enforceable right.
People v. Maloy
Cravaughn Maloy appealed his conviction of patronizing a prostituted child, pimping of a child, keeping a place of child prostitution and inducement of child prostitution. He also appealed the indeterminate sentence of four years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections, imposed for his patronizing conviction.
Specifically, Maloy argued section 18-7-406(1)(a) — criminalizing patronizing a prostituted child — violates his right to equal protection of the laws because it prohibits essentially the same conduct, or less culpable conduct, as other child prostitution offenses (specifically, soliciting for child prostitution, pandering of a child and inducement of child prostitution) while carrying a much higher sentence.
A division of the Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that, under the facts of the case, charging Maloy with patronizing a prostituted child violated his right to equal protection of the laws. The court vacated his conviction and sentence on that count and otherwise affirmed the judgment.
People v. Roddy
After Jonathan Roddy and his wife were convicted of stalking and computer crimes against Roddy’s ex-wife in a complicated series of events, Roddy was given a two-year deferred judgement and 15 months later was ordered to pay more than $680,000 in restitution. Roddy appealed this restitution order, arguing among other things that the prosecution was required to request restitution within 90 days of conviction.
Distinguishing People v. Weeks, a division of the Court of Appeals held that, because the prosecution presented its restitution request 90 days after defendant’s conviction entered, seeking hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorney billings, good cause existed to extend the period for determining restitution so that the defendant would have the opportunity to object to the restitution request and the court would have the opportunity to review and rule on the award. The division reversed the restitution order and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.
Aurora Public School District v. Stapleton Gateway LLC
A division of the Court of Appeals was asked to decide whether a security deposit withdrawn from the court registry must be immediately returned to the court registry when the condemnation is abandoned and the award of damages arising from the abandonment is still pending. The Aurora Public School District appealed the district court’s order denying its request for the deposit’s immediate return to the court registry by Stapleton Gateway LLC after APS abandoned the condemnation. Recognizing the condemnation statute is silent on this issue and the district court retains jurisdiction over the deposit pending the damages resolution, the division held that a district court retains discretion over the location of the deposit. Under the particular circumstances of this case, Stapleton is not required to return the deposit to the court registry before resolving its claim for abandonment damages so the division affirmed the court’s judgment.