Gadeco v. Grynberg
The Colorado Supreme Court considered whether Jack Grynberg impliedly waived the physician-patient privilege by either requesting specific performance of a contract or denying the plaintiffs’ allegations that he made irrational decisions. Grynberg asserted counterclaims for breach of contract against the plaintiffs, his children and former wife. Grynberg’s counterclaims requested the specific performance of an oral or implied-in-fact contract in which his family allegedly agreed to allow Grynberg to control several family companies for his lifetime. The trial court found that Grynberg impliedly waived the physician-patient privilege by asserting those counterclaims and it ordered him to produce three years’ worth of mental health records for in-camera inspection. Grynberg petitioned the Supreme Court to review that ruling pursuant to Colorado Appellate Rule 21.
Previously, the Supreme Court determined that only privilege holders — patients — can impliedly waive the physician-patient privilege and that they do so by injecting their physical or mental condition into the case as the basis of a claim or an affirmative defense.
Privilege holders inject their physical or mental condition into a case as the basis of a claim when they utilize the condition as “the predicate for some form of judicial relief.” As a corollary to that rule, an adverse party cannot inject the patient’s physical or mental condition into a case through its defenses. Finally, patients do not inject their mental condition into the case by denying the opposing party’s allegations.
In keeping with previous interpretations of the implied waiver doctrine, the Supreme Court held that Grynberg did not inject his mental condition into the case as the basis of a claim by alleging that the family breached a contract that does not reference his mental health.
Likewise, he did not inject his mental condition into the case as the basis of a claim or an affirmative defense by denying the family’s allegations that he made irrational decisions.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that Grynberg did not impliedly waive the physician-patient privilege and that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Grynberg to produce his mental health records for in-camera inspection.
Meza v. People
Carlos Meza petitioned for review of the judgment of the district court, sitting as the court of direct appellate review pursuant to the simplified procedure for county court convictions, that affirmed the county court’s order granting a motion for additional restitution. The county court ordered the requested additional amount of restitution, finding that the victim had suffered a loss of $936.85 that was not known to the people or the court at sentencing, when restitution was initially, but not finally, set at $150.
On appeal, the district court found that the annotation “RR” on the form guilty plea was sufficient to reserve the final amount of restitution and that the record supported the county court’s finding of an additional loss not known at sentencing; and it therefore affirmed the increase as having been sanctioned by section 18-1.3-603(3)(a) of the Colorado Revised Statutes.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case to the district court with directions to order reinstatement of the $150 restitution order entered prior to judgment of conviction because a judgment of conviction, absent a statutorily authorized order reserving a determination of the final amount of restitution, finalizes any specific amount already set and because the court ordered no reservation in this case, the court lacked the power to increase the amount of restitution it had previously set.
People v. Belibi
The people petitioned for review of the Court of Appeals’ judgment reversing the amended restitution order of the district court, which substantially increased Belibi’s restitution obligation after his judgment of conviction. Following the acceptance of Belibi’s guilty plea, the imposition of a sentence to probation, including a stipulation to $4,728 restitution, and the entry of judgment, the district court amended its restitution order to require the payment of an additional $302,022 in restitution. The court of Appeals held that in the absence of anything in the court’s written or oral pronouncements reserving a final determination of the amount of restitution, the initial restitution order had become final and could not be amended.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of Appeals because a judgment of conviction, absent a statutorily authorized order reserving a determination of the final amount of restitution due, finalizes any specific amount already set, and therefore the sentencing court lacked the power to increase restitution beyond the previously set amount of $4,728.
Front Range Resources v. Colorado Ground Water Commission
About a decade ago, Front Range Resources, a private company that owns or manages various water rights, applied for a replacement plan in the Lost Creek Designated Ground Water Basin. A replacement plan allowed an applicant to withdraw designated ground water from an alluvial aquifer where no ground water is available for appropriation by replacing the withdrawn ground water with other sources of water. Under the plan, Front Range sought to divert water from its existing water rights to recharge the Lost Creek Basin’s alluvial aquifer. It then planned to withdraw the recharged water by increasing the use of its existing wells and by constructing new wells.
Parties that believed their water rights would be impaired by the plan objected to Front Range’s replacement plan and the Ground Water Commission dismissed Front Range’s application with prejudice. This allowed Front Range to appeal to the district court. Meanwhile, Front Range and the City of Aurora entered into an option contract for Aurora to purchase some or all of the replacement-plan water upon the replacement plan’s approval.
On appeal, the district court rejected Front Range’s use of water rights in the South Platte River in the replacement plan. It further found the replacement plan involved new appropriations and changes of water rights, triggering the anti-speculation doctrine. In granting summary judgment against Front Range, the district court concluded Front Range’s planned use of the replacement-plan water violated the anti-speculation doctrine. Some of the defendants then pursued attorney fees, arguing Front Range’s claims lacked substantial justification. The district court denied their motion.
The Court of Appeals held that the anti-speculation doctrine applied to replacement plans involving new appropriations or changes to designated ground water rights. Because Front Range could not demonstrate that it or Aurora would put the replacement-plan water to beneficial use, the district court did not err in granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court further concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants’ motion for attorney fees.
Sandstead-Corona v. Sandstead
This case involved a dispute between two sisters, Shauna Sandstead-Corona and Vicki Jo Sandstead, over how to divide their mother, Auriel Sandstead’s, estate. Prior to her death, Auriel Sandstead placed proceeds from the sale of the family’s farm into a multi-party bank account on which Sandstead and Corona were also signatories, with the intent that the money would transfer to Sandstead and Corona outside of probate upon Auriel Sandstead’s death. With her mother’s permission, Sandstead later moved a large portion of the funds into different bank accounts that Corona could not access. Auriel subsequently died, and the court appointed Sandstead as the personal representative of Auriel’s probate estate. Corona then filed a motion to surcharge Sandstead for, as pertinent here, her use of the funds that Sandstead had removed from the Wells Fargo Account and placed in the Citizens Bank Accounts.
The Logan County District Court, acting in its capacity as probate court in this proceeding, conducted a trial on Corona’s surcharge motion and determined that Sandstead’s custody of the funds prior to filing a probate proceeding was “in the nature of an implied trust.” The court further concluded that Sandstead had failed to account properly for the funds, thus warranting a surcharge for the unaccounted amounts.
Meanwhile, a pour-over will and related revocable trust executed by Auriel and her late husband were discovered. Corona contested the will and trust on the ground that Auriel and her husband had revoked the trust. The trial court rejected this contention, however, and further concluded that under the trust’s no-contest clause, because Corona had contested the will and trust, she forfeited all property that she would have inherited under the will.
Both Sandstead and Corona appealed, and in a published decision, a split division of the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had erred in surcharging Sandstead for her use of the farm proceeds. The division majority reasoned that the funds at issue were not part of the probate estate. Rather, they passed to Sandstead alone under the probate code’s multi-party account statute. Therefore, the surcharge was inappropriate. The division also affirmed the trial court’s determination regarding the no-contest clause.
Corona petitioned for certiorari and the Supreme Court granted the petition to consider whether an implied trust could be imposed on the farm proceeds that Sandstead had placed in the Citizens Bank Accounts, whether the fiduciary oversight statute in the probate code permitted the trial court to sanction Sandstead for actions taken prior to Auriel’s death and prior to Sandstead’s appointment as personal representative of Auriel’s estate, whether the trial court erred in applying the no-contest clause in the trust to Corona’s challenge to the pour-over will and whether Corona had probable cause to contest the will.
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the division’s ruling. As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court concluded that pursuant to section 13-9-103(3)(b), of the Colorado Revised Statute the trial court had jurisdiction to resolve the present dispute because the dispute presented a question as to whether the funds that Sandstead had placed in the Citizens Bank Accounts were part of Auriel’s probate estate. Turning then to the issues presented, the Supreme Court concluded first that the trial court properly imposed an implied trust over at least a portion of the farm proceeds.
Specifically, when Sandstead moved the funds from the Wells Fargo Account to the Citizens Bank Accounts, she was in a confidential relationship with her mother and Corona. When she then misspent those funds, she abused that confidential relationship, thereby justifying the imposition of an implied trust.
The Supreme Court further concluded that because an implied trust is included in the fiduciary oversight statute’s definition of an “estate,” the trial court could properly surcharge Sandstead for her malfeasance as to the funds in the implied trust.
Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that although the no-contest clause in the trust was incorporated by reference into the will, by its plain language, that clause applied only to actions contesting the trust, not challenges to the will.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court erred in enforcing the no-contest clause against Corona based on her actions contesting the will.