Editor’s Note: Law Week Colorado edits court opinion summaries for style and, when necessary, length.
In 1988, the Colorado General Assembly enacted the Health Care Availability Act. Section 13-64-502(1) of the Colorado Revised Statutes, as originally passed and currently in effect, limits the scope of liability in certain negligence actions against health care professionals. But there is an exception.
As originally passed, the exception authorized lawsuits for “injury” that could have been “prevented or avoided” if the health care professional had acted consistent with the ordinary standard of care.
Soon after the HCAA’s enactment, the Colorado Supreme Court decided Lininger v. Eisenbaum. The case recognized a common-law negligence action seeking damages against a doctor who advised parents that their first child’s eye condition, which resulted in blindness, was not genetic. But their second child developed the same eye condition.
Following that case, the General Assembly amended Section 13-64-502, broadening the statutory bar against negligence actions to preclude claims for “damage or injury” arising from “genetic counseling and screening.” The amendment also expanded the exception to permit lawsuits involving “damage or injury” resulting from a “genetic disease or disorder” that could have been prevented or avoided if the ordinary standard of care had been met.
In this case, the parents brought an action against medical professionals, alleging that negligent genetic testing and counseling led them to believe their twins would not be—but were—affected by a severe medical disorder.
The district court dismissed the parents’ claims under Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), reasoning that the lawsuit did not fall under Section 13-64-502(1)’s exception. But, according to the opinion, the parents’ claims fall squarely under that exception. As for the children’s claims against the medical professionals, the appeals court concluded that the district court properly dismissed them. The appeals court also declined to address damages because the issue was not resolved below.
The appeals court reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.
Welcome to Realty, LLC 401(k) PSP sued to evict Betsy Wilson after she refused to vacate her late mother’s house, which Welcome had obtained through a sheriff’s sale.
Wilson counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that Welcome doesn’t own the house because its failure to follow certain homestead exemption procedures rendered the sheriff’s sale void.
The district court agreed with Wilson, reasoning that, even though she was 57 years old when her mother died, she was entitled to a homestead exemption in the house by virtue of her familial status, occupancy and inheritance of the property. Welcome appealed.
The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded the district court erred when it ruled that Wilson is entitled to a homestead exemption in her mother’s house. Section 38-41-204 of the Colorado Revised Statutes provides that “[w]hen any person dies seized of a homestead leaving a surviving spouse or minor children, such surviving spouse or minor children are entitled to the homestead exemption.”
It also provides that when, as in this case, “there is neither surviving spouse nor minor children, the homestead shall be liable for the debts of the deceased.”
Because Wilson’s late mother left neither a surviving spouse nor minor children, the homestead exemption in her house terminated upon her death. Wilson isn’t entitled to it, according to the opinion. The appeals court found that the district court’s ruling ran contrary to the statute’s plain language.
The appeals court reversed the district court judgment voiding the sheriff’s sale and remanded the case for further proceedings.
According to the opinion, it has become common practice for contracting parties to include a merger or integration clause in a contract, providing that the written contract sets forth the complete terms of the parties’ agreement.
Such completely integrated agreements generally supersede all prior agreements or negotiations between the parties that are covered by the terms of the written contract.
This case addresses the extent to which such agreements supersede other prior agreements between the parties. The appeals court concluded that, absent unambiguous contractual language to the contrary, a completely integrated contract supersedes prior agreements only to the extent they are within its scope.
In this case, LTCPRO and Buck Enterprises Inc. sought a preliminary injunction against two former employees, Jason Johnson and Matthew Forrest, based on alleged breaches of their noncompete agreements.
Relying on a merger clause in a later employment agreement between LTCPRO and Johnson, the district court concluded that the noncompete agreements had been superseded and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.
The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that, under the circumstances of this case, the district court erred when it failed to consider whether Johnson’s noncompete agreement was within the scope of his later agreement. The appeals court also found that the district court erred in concluding that Forrest’s noncompete agreement was superseded when Forrest did not enter into any subsequent agreement.
The appeals court reversed the denial of the motion for preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings.