Editor’s Note: Law Week Colorado edits court opinion summaries for style and, when necessary, length.
On Sept. 5, 2021, several Colorado Springs residents heard gunshots and saw an armed man, who was later identified as Karl Jeran Friday Williams. Police later apprehended him.
Williams was drinking alcohol and had taken cocaine but told an El Paso County deputy sheriff that the cocaine “didn’t taste right.” He speculated that it may have been “glass,” a slang term for methamphetamine.
Williams was charged with several crimes, including three counts of attempted first-degree murder, seven counts of menacing, six counts of child abuse, one count of criminal mischief and one count of prohibited use of a weapon.
At trial, he argued that he acted in self-defense against the people he perceived as threatening him and attempted to raise an involuntary intoxication defense, arguing that he had intended to use cocaine but involuntarily consumed a different drug, which he believed was methamphetamine.
The district court refused to give the jury instruction because it found that Williams’ statement that the cocaine tasted like methamphetamine didn’t meet the “scintilla of evidence” standard required to support an affirmative defense instruction.
On appeal, Williams argued that the district court erred by refusing to give his requested involuntary intoxication instruction.
The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that Williams didn’t present any evidence that the allegedly involuntarily ingested substance is what caused him to be unable “to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” It found the district court didn’t err by rejecting the requested instruction.
The appeals court affirmed.
Jennifer Oviatt, as special administrator of the estate of Joel Patrick Roche, appealed the entry of judgment following a jury verdict in favor of Tonya Gilley.
This appeal required the Colorado Court of Appeals to consider whether a plaintiff seeking recovery for medical treatment costs must present explicit witness testimony that the amount charged in the plaintiff’s medical bills was reasonable.
Because the appeals court concluded that the amount billed is some evidence from which a jury could infer reasonableness of the charges, such explicit testimony is not required.
The appeals court affirmed.
In this negligence case arising from injuries that occurred during a work-related accident involving two independent contractors, Charles Brewer appealed the judgment entered on a jury’s verdict in favor of James Curry.
The jury awarded Curry noneconomic, physical impairment and disfigurement damages. Curry conditionally cross-appealed the judgment.
This case presented a novel statutory interpretation issue: namely, whether two independent contractors who work with each other and not for each other, and who have no agreement between them to perform work for another, are subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado and its limitation on damages found in Section 8-41-401(3) of the Colorado Revised Statutes.
The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that they are not subject to WCA and held that an independent contractor who is injured on the job by the negligence of another independent contractor may recover damages from the other contractor in excess of the $15,000 limit imposed by the WCA because they are third parties as to each other, not co-employees, and thus are not considered to be “in the same employ.”
The appeals court rejected Brewer’s remaining contentions and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Because it affirmed, it didn’t need to address the issues raised in the cross-appeal.
In this post-decree invalidity of marriage case, Nicholas Dale appealed the district court’s order modifying his parenting time with the child he shares with Nicole Jehlicka Diehl.
This appeal required the Colorado Court of Appeals to consider whether a substantial reduction in parenting time can amount to a restriction of a parent’s parenting time rights, thus requiring the district court to find endangerment rather than simply consider the best interests of the child.
The appeals court concluded that a substantial reduction in parenting time alone is not a restriction of parenting time rights.
The appeals court affirmed.