Editor’s Note: Law Week Colorado edits court opinion summaries for style and, when necessary, length.
Nichele Giron, Amanda Giron and Thomas Short brought this civil action based on a fatal motor vehicle collision with a Town of Olathe police officer, Justin Hice. The district court granted governmental immunity to Olathe and Hice under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act and dismissed the case.
In 2022, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed that judgment. Recognizing the undisputed fact that the officer activated his emergency lights only a short distance before the collision, a division of the appeals court held that “an officer is not entitled to immunity when he does not activate his emergency lights or siren for the entire time he exceeds the speed limit and is in pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law.”
In 2024, the Colorado Supreme Court rejected that interpretation and reversed the appeals court’s judgment. The state’s high court held that “an emergency driver waives CGIA immunity when a plaintiff’s injuries could have resulted from the driver’s failure to use alerts while speeding in pursuit of a suspected or actual lawbreaker.”
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the appeals court “to determine if Officer Hice’s failure to use his lights or siren until the final five to ten seconds of his pursuit could have contributed to the accident.”
The appeals court was also directed to “analyze whether Officer Hice waived governmental immunity by failing to satisfy the condition that emergency drivers refrain from endangering life or property while speeding.”
On reconsideration, the appeals court reached two conclusions. First, remand to the district court is unnecessary because it can apply the test articulated by the Supreme Court to the facts as found by the district court to make a determination.
Second, Hice’s failure to use his lights or sirens until the final five to 10 seconds of his pursuit “could have contributed to the accident.”
The appeals court again reversed the district court’s judgement, held that neither Olathe nor Hice is entitled to governmental immunity and directed the district court on remand to reinstate the Girons’ claims.
Campaign Integrity Watchdog LLC v. Colorado Secretary of State
In this campaign finance law dispute, Campaign Integrity Watchdog LLC appealed the district court’s order affirming the Colorado secretary of state’s dismissal of Watchdog’s complaint against Alliance for a Safe and Independent Woodmen Hills.
The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that because the campaign finance enforcement mechanism in Section 1-45-111.7 of the Colorado Revised Statutes is constitutional and that Alliance had a registered agent, it affirmed the order in part.
But because it agreed with Watchdog’s contention that the secretary erred by dismissing its allegation that Alliance had failed to file reports required by Colorado’s campaign finance laws, it reversed the order in part and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Alice Schmier died on Nov. 7, 2018, leaving behind a will that she executed in March 2013. Her husband, Raymond Schmier, and three adult children, including Tim Schmier, survived her.
The will designated Raymond Schmier as the primary beneficiary and trustee of the trust set up by the will, and it directed that, upon Raymond Schmier’s death, the balance of the trust be distributed by representation to the descendants.
On Jan. 9, 2024, Raymond Schmier simultaneously filed three documents, including a “Notice of Hearing Without Appearance on Petition for Final Settlement,” that identified Jan. 30, 2024, as the date of the hearing without appearance. Raymond Schmier’s attorney served the notice on Tim Schmier’s attorney.
The following day, Raymond Schmier filed a “Receipt and Release” indicating that all distributions from the decedent’s estate had been satisfied in accordance with the family trust. A few hours later, the magistrate entered two orders closing the estate.
Tim Schmier filed an appeal, alleging that the magistrate erred by closing the probate estate without a hearing.
The Colorado Court of Appeals found that the magistrate erred by denying Tim Schmier the opportunity to challenge Raymond Schmier’s accounting of the estate’s inventory, which is the one thing Tim had been requesting all along.
The appeals court reversed the estate-closing orders. It remanded the case to the district court with directions to reopen the estate and calculate the amount of Tim Schmier’s appellate costs award. If Tim Schmier maintains his objection to the closure of the estate, the district court must hold a hearing as required after proper notice.
Beauty Bar LLC v. Division of Labor Standards and Statistics
In this wage dispute, 303 Beauty Bar LLC, doing business as 303 Salon LoHi, appealed a determination by the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment’s Division of Labor Standards and Statistics that the salon violated Section 8-4-105(1)(b) of the Colorado Revised Statutes by improperly deducting certain expenses from its employee’s pay.
The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that the wage deductions were for the employer’s costs of doing business and that an agreement for such deductions was unenforceable under Section 8-4-105(1)(b).
The appeals court affirmed.
George Tracy v. David Surofchek
George and Amy Tracy appealed the district court’s order declining to award them the costs of letters of credit they obtained to stay execution of a judgment against them pending their ultimately successful appeal of a part of that judgment.
The district court concluded that such costs aren’t recoverable as costs of appeal under Colorado Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(c)(1)(C) as a matter of law.
The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that a successful appellant may recover the reasonable cost of a letter of credit that the appellant obtains and delivers, and the district court approves, in lieu of a supersedeas bond to stay execution of a civil judgment pending appeal.
The appeals court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case to the district court to determine the reasonable costs of the Tracys’ letters of credit.