Editor’s Note: Law Week Colorado edits court opinion summaries for style and, when necessary, length.
The government appealed the district court’s order suppressing DNA evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant. The district court suppressed the evidence because it decided the warrant violated the U.S. Supreme Court case Franks v. Delaware, in which the high court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits an affiant from recklessly or intentionally including a material, false statement of fact in a search-warrant affidavit.
Here, the warrant affidavit included a false statement made to the affiant by New Mexico Highlands University Police Chief Clarence Romero. Romero made the false statement to FBI Agent Bryan Acee, who in turn included the statement in an affidavit for a search warrant to obtain Shawn Michael Norton’s DNA.
The district court ruled that the inclusion of Romero’s false statement in the affidavit violated Franks. On appeal, the government argues only that Franks is inapplicable to Romero because he was off duty at the relevant time and didn’t possess an official investigatory role.
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals held that Franks extends to an off-duty police officer who is actually involved in an investigation with the knowledge and acquiescence of the on-duty officers. Whether a police officer is actually involved in an investigation is a mixed question of law and fact that is primarily factual in nature, and the 10th Circuit reviewed that for plain error.
The 10th Circuit affirmed.
Tachias, et al. v. Sanders, et al.
Dana Sanders was the superintendent of the Los Lunas, New Mexico Public Schools when Rowena Tachias and Monique Dereta created a Facebook page titled the “Los Lunas School District Parent Discussion Page” and used it to publicly discuss school-related matters online.
Sometime after the page’s creation, Sanders learned of it and felt that it was problematic for the school district. Sanders then undertook a series of actions, including investigating the page, discussing it with numerous people, filing a trademark for the name of the school district and eventually issuing cease-and-desist letters demanding that the appellees delete the page.
The cease-and-desist letters—which threatened future litigation if the appellees didn’t comply—alarmed the appellees, who felt that their First Amendment rights were being stifled.
The appellees sued Sanders and the Los Lunas School Board, alleging that Sanders violated their First Amendment rights by threatening frivolous legal action against them in retaliation for their speech.
Sanders alone, in her individual capacity, asserted qualified immunity against this First Amendment retaliation claim and moved for summary judgment. The district court denied Sanders’ motion and held that she wasn’t entitled to qualified immunity. This interlocutory appeal followed.
Reviewing de novo, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that Sanders isn’t entitled to qualified immunity.
The district court determined both that a constitutional violation occurred and that the violation was clearly established under existing precedent at the time of Sanders’ conduct. In so concluding, the district court reasoned that Sanders’ threatened lawsuit was retaliatory, speech-chilling and legally frivolous, such that it violated the appellees’ First Amendment rights.
The 10th Circuit first held that, due to inadequate briefing on appeal, Sanders waived any challenge to the denial of qualified immunity on the first prong—that a constitutional violation occurred. On the second prong, the 10th Circuit held that the facts in this case are “materially similar” to those in a prior opinion and therefore Sanders’ actions violated clearly established law.
Specifically, the 10th Circuit held that it was clearly established at the time of Sanders’ conduct that government actors violate the First Amendment when they threaten frivolous legal actions in retaliation for a person’s constitutionally protected speech.
The 10th Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Sanders’ motion for summary judgment.
This appeal stems from a delayed revocation hearing under 18 U.S.C. Section 3583(i), which extends the district court’s power to revoke an expired term of supervised release if “a warrant or summons has been issued” before the expiration, and the delay from expiration to revocation is “reasonably necessary.”
Tegan Gulley served a three-year term of supervised release—the statutory maximum for his offense. A petition to revoke Gulley’s supervised release was filed—and a summons issued—a few days before the term expired, but the district court delayed the revocation hearing for six months at Gulley’s request.
The district court ordered Gulley to remain on his already expired term of supervision until the continued revocation hearing. Ultimately, the district court revoked supervision and imposed a custodial sentence of 15 months.
Gulley appealed that judgment, arguing that the six-month delay was not “reasonably necessary” and the district court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the revocation petition.
Exercising appellate jurisdiction, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Gulley.
The 10th Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to release Gulley from custody.
Judge Joel Carson dissented.
Carson wrote that although he recognized the appeal of a clean jurisdictional disposition and agreed that Section 3583(i) has a jurisdictional component, the facts of this case didn’t present a jurisdictional problem. He respectfully dissented.
Whale Family Investments, et al. v. Concord01, LLC, et al.
This appeal presents a dispute between a company’s minority shareholders—Whale Family Investments LP and Ranslem Capital LP—and its majority shareholders—the various defendants.
After defendants amended the company’s operating agreement to give the company and its board the power to forcibly redeem plaintiffs’ shares, the board used that power to redeem the shares for less than market value, according to the opinion. The plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, challenging the operating agreement amendment.
The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction, holding that they lacked Article III standing because their stated injury, premised on forced redemption of their shares at an unjust price, was not fairly traceable to defendants’ allegedly improper amendment of the operating agreement.
The district court reasoned that defendants had the power to forcibly redeem plaintiffs’ shares under the original agreement, such that the amendment didn’t cause plaintiffs’ harm.
But the complaint plausibly alleges that the 2011 operating agreement entitled them to fair market value for their units and it plausibly attributes the undervaluation of their units to the 2022 operating agreement. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals concluded plaintiffs have standing and reversed.