Editor’s Note: Law Week Colorado edits court opinion summaries for style and, when necessary, length.
Joseph Prince, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability to challenge the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S. Code 2255 motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. Prince also requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The 10th Circuit denied both requests and dismissed this matter.
Prince worked as a “Beneficiary/Provider Relationships Specialist” for the Department of Veterans Affairs’ Spina Bifida Health Care Benefits Program. The program provides medical coverage to persons born with spina bifida after their parents were exposed to Agent Orange in the Korean or Vietnam wars. Through the program, the VA pays for beneficiaries to obtain home health aide services from approved providers. The home health aides must meet certain qualifications and be supervised by a registered nurse.
Prince enlisted his family and friends to set up and run sham home healthcare agencies that weren’t approved by the program and didn’t employ registered nurse supervisors, the opinion noted. He recruited caregivers of spina bifida patients to work as health aides for the sham agencies, which then billed the VA for the home health aide services. Prince and his associates gave some of the compensation to the caregivers and pocketed the rest, the opinion added. When Prince’s fraud was discovered, the sham agencies had billed the VA for more than $20 million and the VA had paid more than $18 million, according to the opinion.
Prince was indicted on 45 counts related to the fraudulent home health agencies and fraudulent billing. Before trial, he filed a notice of disposition stating he’d reached a proposed plea agreement with the government and requested a change of plea hearing. He then withdrew his request and asked the district court to reset his case for trial. The case went to trial and the jury found him guilty of all 45 counts.
When the district court sentenced Prince, it calculated a sentencing guidelines total offense level of 36, which included a four-level upward adjustment because “the defendant was convicted of a Federal health care offense involving a Government health care program” and the loss to the program was more than $20 million — U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(7). Under the guideline commentary, a program’s “loss” is the greater of the actual loss — the victim’s financial harm — or the intended loss — the amount of financial harm the defendant sought to cause, including unsuccessful attempts, the opinion added.
For government healthcare fraud, intended loss is typically “the aggregate dollar amount of fraudulent bills submitted to the Government health care program” — 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(viii). Here, the actual loss was $18,777,134.68 — the amount the VA paid — and the intended loss was $20,060,081.16 — the amount billed to the VA, according to the opinion. Prince didn’t challenge that the intended loss should be used to calculate loss. He argued instead the district court should have deducted any value the VA received from the sham services.
The district court disagreed and Prince’s intended loss was more than $20 million, triggering the four-point upward adjustment to a total offense level of 36. With Prince’s criminal history category of I, his guidelines range was 188 to 235 months. Prince was sentenced to 192 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. He was ordered to pay more than $18 million in restitution to the VA.
Prince appealed again challenging the district court’s failure to deduct the value of the sham services from the amount billed to the VA. The 10th Circuit affirmed his sentence.
Prince filed a motion in the district court to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence under 28 U.S. Code 2255. The court denied his motion, holding most of his claims were “wholly undeveloped.”
But it considered whether his lawyers were ineffective for failing to properly advise him about whether he should plead guilty or for failing to challenge the district court’s reliance on the guideline commentary after the U.S. Supreme Court case Kisor v. Wilkie.
The district court rejected Prince’s claim that he wasn’t properly advised about his plea because the record refuted his allegations and because he didn’t “establish a reasonable probability that he would have pleaded guilty but for counsel’s errors.” The court also concluded Prince’s attorneys were not ineffective for failing to raise a Kisor argument because they would have been among the first to do so. And it said he couldn’t show prejudice because his sentence would still have been within the guideline range.
Prince sought a certificate of appealability on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
After evaluation, the 10th Circuit denied Prince’s request for a certificate of appealability and dismissed this matter. Because he didn’t present “a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal,” the 10th Circuit also denied his request to proceed in forma pauperis, citing the decision DeBardeleben v. Quinlan.
Quint et al. v. Vail Resorts, Inc.
Randy Quint, John Linn and Mark Molina filed a class and collective action against Vail Resorts, Inc., in the District of Colorado alleging violations of federal and state labor laws. Different plaintiffs filed similar lawsuits against a Vail subsidiary, which are pending in federal and state courts in California, the opinion noted. After Vail gave notice it had agreed to a nationwide settlement with some of the other plaintiffs, the Colorado plaintiffs filed an emergency motion asking the district court to enjoin Vail from consummating the settlement. The district court denied their motion, and the Colorado plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal. The 10th Circuit affirmed.
The Colorado action alleged that certain of Vail’s nationwide employment practices violate the Fair Labor Standards Act and state law. The Colorado plaintiffs sought payment of unpaid wages, overtime and other benefits for themselves and similarly situated parties. Five other actions filed by different plaintiffs in California asserted similar claims against Vail subsidiaries.
Vail notified the Colorado plaintiffs and the district court it had negotiated a nationwide settlement with other plaintiffs encompassing all claims for alleged unpaid wages and any other violation of state or federal law involving Vail and its subsidiaries. Vail initially indicated the settlement would be submitted for approval in the district court in the Eastern District of California, but the settling parties later stipulated to stay the California federal-court actions and seek approval of the settlement in a California state-court action. The Colorado plaintiffs filed an emergency motion seeking an injunction under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S. Code 1651, “to enjoin [Vail] from consummating a facially collusive ‘reverse auction’ settlement in a recently filed placeholder California state court action or any other court.”
A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation to deny the injunction motion, concluding the relief the Colorado plaintiffs sought was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S. Code 2283. The district court overruled the Colorado plaintiffs’ objections, accepted and adopted the report and recommendation and denied the injunction motion. The Colorado plaintiffs appealed.
The Colorado plaintiffs argued the district court erred by: applying the wrong standard in reviewing the report and recommendation; holding the Anti-Injunction Act applies to an injunction against Vail rather than the state court; declining to consider one exception to the Anti-Injunction Act; holding a second exception to the Anti-Injunction Act didn’t apply; failing to enforce the first-to-file rule; and abstaining under the Colorado River doctrine.
After evaluation, the 10th Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying the injunction motion.