Editor’s Note: Law Week Colorado edits court opinion summaries for style and, when necessary, length.
According to the opinion, Gonzalo Rodriguez admitted to five violations of his supervised release conditions. The district court determined his sentence using the grade of the most serious violation, as defined in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
Of Rodriguez’s five violations, two were Grade B violations and two were Grade C violations. The remaining violation was a conviction for conspiracy to commit the Colorado offense of felony menacing. The violation report classified it as Grade A.
Rodriguez objected to the classification on two grounds. First, he argued to be a Grade A violation under the guidelines, the conspiracy offense had to be a crime of violence as defined in Application Note 1 to the guidelines And he argued relying on Application Note 1 would be inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court decision Kisor v. Wilkie. Second, Rodriguez argued “Colorado conspiracy” couldn’t qualify as “conspiracy” under Application Note 1 because Colorado applies a unilateral approach to conspiracy instead of federal law’s bilateral approach, thus criminalizing more conduct. He argued if he prevailed on either argument, his conspiracy conviction should be reduced to a Grade B violation.
The government’s written response didn’t discuss Rodriguez’s Kisor argument, the opinion noted. Instead, it argued the “‘enumerated offense’” of “conspiracy” “‘refers to the generic, contemporary meaning of the offense,” which is understood by looking to federal law as well as “[s]tate[] criminal codes” and “prominent secondary sources,” citing the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals decision U.S. v. Martinez-Cruz. It urged that under “the definition of conspiracy now used in the criminal codes of most States,” “Conspiracy to Commit Felony Menacing is a crime of violence.”
The district court adopted the government’s position and didn’t discuss Rodriguez’s Kisor argument. Because it held his highest-grade violation was Grade A, his guidelines recommendation was 24 months. The court sentenced Rodriguez to 12 months and one day in prison, followed by two years of supervised release.
Rodriguez timely appealed, but after evaluation, the 10th Circuit affirmed the ruling.
Thierry Roberson appealed the district court’s denial of his pro se motion for compassionate release under Section 18 U.S. Code 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals exercised jurisdiction under Section 28 U.S.C. 1291. Because the district court was required to treat Roberson’s motion as filed under Section 28 U.S.C. 2255, the 10th Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
According to the opinion, Roberson pleaded guilty in 2019 to three counts of possession of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of Section 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The district court sentenced him to three consecutive seven-year terms for a total of 21 years of imprisonment. Roberson didn’t appeal. He also didn’t move to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence under Section 2255.
In 2023, Roberson asked the district court for a sentence reduction under 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), commonly referred to as compassionate release. He argued the offenses underlying two of his 924(c) convictions didn’t qualify as crimes of violence. The relevant predicate offenses were robberies in violation of the Hobbs Act. Roberson contended there were extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce his sentence because these 924(c) convictions were void.
The district court denied Roberson’s 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion. It rejected his contention Hobbs Act robbery doesn’t qualify as a crime of violence, and Roberson therefore failed to provide extraordinary or compelling reasons why the court should consider compassionate release.
After evaluation, the 10th Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying Roberson relief under 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and remanded this matter to the district court for further proceedings.
Jeremiah Casper filed a lengthy, handwritten civil rights complaint asserting approximately 24 claims against various individuals employed by the Pitkin County Sheriff’s Office. The magistrate judge ordered Casper to refile his complaint using a court-approved prisoner complaint form. Casper responded by filing an amended complaint on a court-approved prisoner complaint form.
According to the opinion, Casper failed to substantially complete the form. Both the magistrate judge and the district court directed Casper to utilize and complete a court-approved prisoner complaint form and to attach additional pages as needed to complete the sections of the approved form. Casper filed a second amended complaint. Although the first portion of the second amended complaint included a court-approved prisoner complaint form, Casper again failed to substantially complete the form and instead attached a handwritten complaint to the form that was similar to his original complaint. The district court responded by dismissing the case without prejudice due to Casper’s failure to comply with the court’s orders. Casper appealed.
The 10th Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court and denied Casper’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.