The Colorado Supreme Court heard Przekurat v. Torres on May 10 at Gunnison High School as part of its Courts in the Community program. The case, which questions liability for providing alcohol to a minor who later caused injury to another, seemed relevant for the high school audience because of the subject matter and the arguments’ focus on the facts.
Arguments turned on the interpretation of the word “knowingly” in the Colorado Dram Shop Act Section 12-47- 801(4)(a)(I). The legislature amended the statute in 2005 to impose civil liability when a social host knowingly provides a person under 21 a place to drink alcohol, in addition to liability for providing the alcohol itself. However, the section begins with a general exemption from liability for social hosts providing alcohol, and knowingly providing alcohol or a place to consume it to an underage person is an exception.
Jerome Przekurat sued on behalf of his son, Jared Przekurat, for serious injuries that rendered him incompetent, which he sustained from a crash as a passenger in a car driven by Hank Sieck. Sieck, then 20, had drunk a substantial amount of alcohol at a house party in Boulder hosted by defendants Christopher Torres, Samuel Stimson, Peter Stimson and Mitchell Davis. Afterward he left with Jared Przekurat and Victor Mejia, driving Przekurat’s car, and caused an accident in which Przekurat was thrown from the car.
Jerome Przekurat sued Torres, Samuel and Peter Stimson and Davis, claiming they should be held liable under the Dram Shop Act’s social host provision. Sieck did not know the hosts, and the district court record did not contain evidence that Sieck or anyone else told the hosts he was under 21.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the hosts, finding they had no actual knowledge that Sieck was under 21 and was either knowingly supplied alcohol or knowingly allowed to drink alcohol on their property. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in 2016.
Przekurat’s attorney, Timms Fowler, argued constructive knowledge should be sufficient to meet the statutory requirement of “knowingly.” Under the argument, although the social hosts did not know Sieck personally, they had constructive knowledge Sieck was underage and they had provided a place for him to drink alcohol.
“You throw a wide-open party, you invite anybody you want, you let anybody in, you put out alcohol in a buffet style, you have no control over the point of access or entry to the venue,” Fowler said. “In this case, the hosts divested themselves of control of the kegs by just setting [them] out with the Solo cups and letting anybody help themselves.”
Some of the justices expressed reservations about Fowler’s proposed broad application of constructive knowledge. Justice Melissa Hart said the wording of the social host provision seems to refer to a specific person in its mention of providing alcohol or a place to consume it, because the section establishes liability for a social host who knowingly “… provided the person under the age of twenty-one a place to consume an alcoholic beverage.”
“It seems there is an intent or a suggestion there that the statute’s referring to a specific person and the conduct is knowing with regard to both pieces of that conduct,” Hart said. She later compared Section 12-47- 801(4)(a)(I) to other states’ adaptations of the Dram Shop Act that specifically include a reasonableness standard for knowledge of a person’s age in the given circumstances.
“Just the word ‘knowingly’ is generally construed to require actual knowledge without some evidence in the statute that it means something else,” she said.
Plaintiffs’ attorney Colin Campbell argued the legislature intended the Dram Shop Act as a balancing of interests between deterring underage drinking and limiting liability of a person for the actions of others that cause harm. But during arguments for the defense, some justices’ questioning crept into the facts of the case. Justice Brian Boatright asked whether liability applies only if a host knows a person is underage sets up an argument of plausible deniability.
“You look at the facts of this case and you say, ‘What did you expect? You’re throwing an open party on a college campus. You really didn’t think underage people were coming in there?’”
Justice Richard Gabriel questioned the district court’s granting of summary judgment in the party hosts’ favor. He implied there actually may have been enough circumstantial evidence in the record to suggest the hosts’ knowledge of underage people’s presence at the party. Some of that evidence included the fact that one host was under 21 and he extended an invitation to a friend who was also underage. “How do we not at least get enough of an inference to let a reasonable jury find that your clients knew people under 21 were getting alcohol?” he said.
Campbell argued the four defendants who lived in the house did not invite anyone underage to the party, and rather a fifth defendant involved with planning the party who did not live in the house circulated invitations via social media, text messages and fliers. He argued some of the attendees were deposed, and the record can trace who their invitations originated from.
The fifth defendant, Robert Fix, ultimately faced a reversal of summary judgment in his favor separate from the case in front of the justices on May 10. Some evidence in the record showed he knew Sieck before the party, interacted with him there and knew he was underage.
“These kids, they just know about these parties,” said Chief Justice Nancy Rice. “Isn’t that what we’re trying to get at here, whether that kind of conduct is knowing that people who are underage will show up at this place which has been designated as a party place?”
Campbell acknowledged social hosts can’t insulate themselves from liability for an underage person’s drinking if the person appears to be under 21. “Hank Sieck was 20 years and some months old,” Campbell said. “There was no evidence that he appeared to be less than 21.” He added he believes the plaintiffs have to prove the hosts’ knowledge both that they knew Sieck was at the party and that he was under 21.
When justices questioned whether hosts would be liable if the party in question was for high school students, Campbell said he believes that circumstance would imply constructive knowledge sufficient to create liability. He said he believed varying the fact set in the case could yield a different result for each hypothetical situation.
Campbell argued the legislature did not intend to impose a strict liability or “should have known” standard in the Dram Shop statute, and the court should not do so.
“If we were to impose either of those, we would be rewriting the statute. We would be usurping the legislative function,” he said. Campbell said he believes the legislature intended to give social hosts the broadest protection possible from liability.
“I think the language that they chose to use in 2005 gives us all the answers that we need,” he said. “That the social host is only liable if they knew that the person that they were providing alcohol to was in fact under 21.”
— Julia Cardi